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ARTICLES
PADILLA V. KENTUCKY: A NEW CHAPTER IN
SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE ON
WHETHER DEPORTATION CONSTITUTES
PUNISHMENT FOR LAWFUL PERMANENT
RESIDENTS?
ANITA ORTIZ MADDALI*
In this Article, I argue that the deportation of lawful permanent residents on
account of a criminal conviction is punitive, and therefore enhanced constitutional
protections must be afforded to lawful permanent residents during removal
proceedings. To support this argument I rely, in part, on the Supreme Court’s
recent decision in Padilla v. Kentucky. The Padilla Court held that counsel must
inform a client when a plea carries the risk of deportation. The Court’s analysis
throughout the decision is groundbreaking in its recognition of the modern day
realities of deportation—specifically the growing relationship between the
immigration and criminal justice systems and the ways in which criminal
convictions and deportation have become enmeshed over the years. The Court’s
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language provides support for the argument that deportation may not be a
remedial exercise by the government to enforce immigration laws—as the Court
has held for over a century—but may in fact constitute punishment. If deportation
is recognized as punishment, then additional constitutional protections, like the
right to counsel, must be afforded to lawful permanent residents who are in
removal proceedings on account of criminal convictions.
This Article is novel in two respects. First, it offers a fresh look at the punitive
nature of deportation, using the Padilla decision, and other case law, to bolster this
argument. Second, this Article suggests that the analytical approach used by the
Supreme Court in its juvenile delinquency jurisprudence, which extended greater
constitutional protections to juveniles during the adjudicative stage of delinquency
proceedings, could provide the framework for determining which protections
should be afforded to lawful permanent residents who are in removal proceedings
on account of a criminal conviction. Like deportation, juvenile delinquency
proceedings have been labeled civil, but the Court has recognized that because a
finding of delinquency could result in incarceration, the Due Process Clause
requires additional protections during these proceedings. Similarly, lawful
permanent residents face the risk of being removed from their country of
permanent residence—this results in separation from family and removal from a
person’s home. As such, due process requires the need for additional protections.
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INTRODUCTION
The recent United States Supreme Court decision in Padilla v. Kentucky1
arguably has changed how the deportation2 of lawful permanent residents is
viewed in the law. The Supreme Court has consistently held that
deportation never constitutes punishment.3 This has served as justification
for the denial of constitutional criminal safeguards during removal
proceedings. But when deportation is predicated upon a criminal
conviction, as it often is today, the case for classifying deportation as
punishment becomes stronger. As I will show, Padilla has fortified that
conclusion. This Article explores the groundbreaking nature of the Padilla
decision and how it changes the traditional view that deportation is not
punitive.4
1. 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010).
2. Prior to the passage of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), proceedings were referred to as exclusion and deportation
proceedings. After the passage of IIRIRA, the law combined the two, referring to both as
removal proceedings. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 § 240, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a
(2006). I do not focus on exclusion—those who are found to be inadmissible—i.e. those
who have not been lawfully admitted into the United States. See id. § 212(a). Instead, I
focus on the removal of noncitizens after lawful arrival into the United States. Thus, as
shorthand throughout this Article, I use the word “deportation” to refer to the removal of
noncitizens after arrival.
3. See, e.g., Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 491 (1999)
(emphasizing the use of deportation as a means of correcting immigration violations);
Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585, 591 (1913) (focusing on the government’s power to
expel undesirable residents); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893)
(“The order of deportation is not a punishment for crime.”).
4. I have been guided by the ideas proposed by other eminent scholars. E.g., Javier
Bleichmar, Deportation as Punishment: A Historical Analysis of the British Practice of
Banishment and its Impact on Modern Constitutional Law, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 115
(1999); Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, and Punishment: Some Thoughts
About Why Hard Laws Make Bad Cases, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1890 (2000); Won Kidane,
Committing a Crime While a Refugee: Rethinking the Issue of Deportation In Light of the
Principle Against Double Jeopardy, 34 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 383 (2007); Stephen H.
Legomsky, Transporting Padilla to Deportation Proceedings: A Due Process Right to the
Effective Assistance of Counsel, 31 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011)
(discussing the significance of the Padilla decision’s emphasis on the punitive nature and
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Based on the logic employed in Padilla, I argue that the deportation of
lawful permanent residents on the grounds of criminal convictions has to be
considered punishment, and that additional constitutional safeguards should
be afforded to lawful permanent residents in removal proceedings. I also
argue that this is the logical extension of the Supreme Court’s decision in
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez,5 which set forth factors for examining
whether a sanction is punitive.6 Finally, I suggest a framework for
assessing which constitutional criminal safeguards should be afforded to
lawful permanent residents in removal proceedings.
In brief, Padilla held that counsel must adequately inform clients when a
plea carries a risk of deportation.7 Recognizing that “[t]he severity of
deportation [is] ‘the equivalent of banishment or exile,’” the Court stated
that the Sixth Amendment demanded such a professional duty.8
The language and logic employed by the Padilla Court supports the
argument that deportation can constitute punishment. First, while the Court
refrained from classifying deportation as a direct or collateral consequence
of a plea, its description of deportation seemed to suggest that deportation
is a direct consequence of a plea and, therefore, part of the criminal
punishment imposed. Second, the Court emphasized the severity of
deportation, particularly for lawful permanent residents, recognizing that
deportation is the equivalent of banishment or exile.9 I argue that these two
emphases demonstrate that deportation for lawful permanent residents,
when triggered by a criminal conviction, is punitive.
Part I of this Article will explore the distinction between criminal and
civil proceedings, as this distinction is the touchstone for the provision of
certain constitutional protections. These constitutional criminal protections
severity of removal and the Court’s characterization of deportation as a civil-criminal
hybrid, and thus arguing that the constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel
should apply to all noncitizens and all deportability grounds); Stephen H. Legomsky, The
New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms, 64
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469 (2007) [hereinafter Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration
Law]; Stephen H. Legomsky, Deportation of an Alien for a Marijuana Conviction Can
Constitute Cruel and Unusual Punishment: Lieggi v. United States Immigration and
Naturalization Service, 389 F. Supp. 12 (N.D. Ill. 1975), 13 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 454 (1976)
[hereinafter Legomsky, Deportation of an Alien for a Marijuana Conviction]; Peter L.
Markowitz, Straddling the Civil-Criminal Divide: A Bifurcated Approach to Understanding
the Nature of Immigration Removal Proceedings, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 289 (2008);
Robert Pauw, A New Look at Deportation as Punishment: Why at Least Some of the
Constitution’s Criminal Procedure Protections Must Apply, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 305 (2000);
Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56
AM. U. L. REV. 367 (2006); Maureen A. Sweeney, Fact or Fiction: The Legal Construction
of Immigration Removal for Crimes, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 47 (2010).
5. 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
6. Id. at 168–69.
7. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010).
8. Id. (quoting Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388, 391 (1947)).
9. Id.
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are typically not afforded during civil proceedings. As seen in the case
law, the Supreme Court has recognized that some civil penalties may be
punitive in nature and may require enhanced constitutional protections.
However, at least in the removal context, the Court had always labeled
deportation as a civil, non-punitive penalty. This section will provide an
analysis of the key cases decided by the Supreme Court holding that
removal proceedings are civil and that deportation does not constitute
punishment.
Part II will detail the changes in immigration law that have tied the
immigration process to the criminal process over the years, making the
Supreme Court’s reflexive rationale for finding that deportation is not
punishment outdated. Specifically, this section will review the expansion
of the criminal grounds leading to deportation and the interrelationship
between the immigration and criminal systems.
Part III will review the Padilla decision. In this section, I parse the
language that suggests deportation can constitute punishment. Part IV will
explain why deportation of lawful permanent residents on account of
criminal convictions constitutes punishment. I separate the treatment of
lawful permanent residents from other non-citizens because of their unique
nature—having more rights than non-citizens, while not having the
complete freedom afforded to citizens. Here, I will argue that the goal of
deportation for lawful permanent residents no longer serves the remedial
purpose of regulating the immigration process, but seeks to punish
permanent residents for the underlying criminal behavior. I will then
utilize the factors outlined by the Supreme Court in Mendoza-Martinez,
with the support of the Padilla decision, to demonstrate that the deportation
of lawful permanent residents convicted of crimes is punishment.
Finally, Part V suggests a principled approach for determining which
constitutional criminal protections should be afforded to lawful permanent
residents in removal proceedings on account of criminal convictions. I
suggest that the standard applied by the Supreme Court in the juvenile
delinquency context—fundamental fairness under the Due Process
Clause—should be applied in the deportation realm. I also examine the test
employed by the Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge10 to determine the
procedural protections that should be afforded to lawful permanent
residents who are in removal proceedings based upon criminal convictions.

10. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
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CLASSIFICATION OF DEPORTATION AS CIVIL/NON-PUNITIVE

A. Labels Can be Misleading—the Civil/Criminal Law Distinction
It might appear that the law is generally split into two broad categories—
civil and criminal. But the line between these two categories is ambiguous.
The traditional view is that civil law primarily emphasizes compensation
and restitution while criminal law deters and punishes.11 Because of the
punitive nature of criminal laws, heightened constitutional protections are
afforded to individuals in criminal proceedings.
[C]riminal law is distinguished by its punitive purposes, its high
procedural barriers to conviction, its concern with the blameworthiness
of the defendant, and its particularly harsh sanctions. In contrast, the
civil law is defined as a compensatory scheme, focusing on damage
rather than on blameworthiness, and providing less severe sanctions and
lower procedural safeguards than the criminal law.12

In fact, certain provisions of the Bill of Rights only refer to criminal
proceedings.13 It has been argued that Congress has purposefully labeled
some sanctions civil “to ensure the efficient control of private behavior
without the need to honor such pesky rights as the guarantees against
double jeopardy and excessive fines, and most importantly, the requirement
that the state prove its cause beyond a reasonable doubt before inflicting
punishment on a defendant.”14
Yet in spite of these broad generalizations, civil and criminal law do not
necessarily fit into the broad categories mentioned above—punishment
versus compensation and restitution. For instance, tort law imposes
punitive damages as a form of deterrence.15 Incarceration—typically
associated with criminal law—can be imposed in the civil context for civil
contempt.16 Moreover, fines—typically associated with civil law—can be

11. See Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middleground Between Criminal
and Civil Law, 101 YALE L.J. 1795, 1799, 1802 (1992) (arguing for an increase in punitive
civil monetary sanctions that would fall in the “middleground” between criminal and civil
law and would warrant heightened procedural protections, though not as stringent as those
afforded during criminal proceedings).
12. Id. at 1799.
13. The Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause and the Sixth Amendment are
limited to criminal proceedings, but the Self-Incrimination Clause has been applied in civil
forfeiture proceedings when the culpability of the owner was a relevant part of the forfeiture
statute. See, e.g., United States v. U.S. Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 721–22 (1971)
(stating that the Fifth Amendment may be properly invoked in civil forfeiture proceedings).
14. Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Civil and Criminal Sanctions in the Constitution and
Courts, 94 GEO. L.J. 1, 6 (2005). Fellmeth argues that the distinction between criminal and
civil law is “the least well-considered and principled in American legal theory.” Id. at 3.
15. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (1979) (imposing punitive damages to
both punish and deter “outrageous conduct” stemming from “the defendant’s evil motive or
reckless indifference to the rights of others”).
16. Mann, supra note 11, at 1804.
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imposed in the criminal context as well.17
With the expansion of punitive civil sanctions, “the bifurcation of legal
sanctions into two categories is misleading.”18 In fact, “punishment no
longer seems a distinctive attribute of the criminal law.”19 Keeping in mind
that civil sanctions may be more severe than the actual criminal sanction
imposed,20 the Supreme Court has extended constitutional criminal
protections to “civil cases” when it has viewed the civil penalty as
punitive.21
Under the Court’s reasoning, even if a proceeding is formally civil, the
extension of constitutional criminal safeguards is not necessarily prohibited
if the effect of the civil sanction is punitive. As an example, the Court has
taken pains to review whether statutes divesting citizenship are punitive in
nature,22 and whether certain civil forfeiture sanctions are punitive.23 In
doing so, the Court has assessed “whether the statutory scheme was so
punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate that intention [to establish a
civil penalty].”24 It is noteworthy that in this respect, the Court has
afforded great deference to the label applied by the legislature.25 The Court
17. Id.
18. Id. at 1797.
19. Id. at 1804.
20. Id. at 1797–98.
21. See United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 280 (1996) (“Though it was well
established that ‘a civil remedy does not rise to the level of ‘punishment’ merely because
Congress provided for civil recovery in excess of the Government’s actual damages,’ we
found that our case law did ‘not foreclose the possibility that in a particular case a civil
penalty . . . may be so extreme and so divorced from the Government’s damages and
expenses as to constitute punishment.’” (citation omitted)); see also One Lot Emerald Cut
Stones & One Ring v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 237 (1972) (per curiam) (stating whether
a particular penalty is civil or criminal depends upon statutory construction).
22. See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 164 (1963) (automatic forfeiture
of citizenship); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 103 (1958) (removal of citizenship for
desertion of armed services).
23. See United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 449–50 (1989) (holding that double
jeopardy barred civil sanctions following a criminal punishment when the civil sanctions
were punitive in nature), abrogated by Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 103–05 (1997)
(stating that petitioners who were subjected to monetary penalties and debarment after
violating federal banking statutes could, under the Double Jeopardy Clause, face criminal
charges). According to the Court, the Double Jeopardy Clause only prohibits the imposition
of multiple criminal punishments for the same offense. Hudson, 522 U.S. at 99. Because
there was no proof that the civil sanctions were “‘so punitive in form and effect as to render
them criminal,’” the Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause did not apply. Id. at 104–
05 (quoting Ursery, 518 U.S. at 290); see also United States v. One Assortment of 89
Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 366 (1984) (holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar a
civil forfeiture proceeding that follows an acquittal on criminal charges); One 1958
Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 698, 700, 702 (1965) (holding that the
Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on illegal search and seizure applies to civil forfeiture
proceedings that are “quasi-criminal” in nature); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634
(1886) (holding that the unlawful search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment and the
Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment applies to civil forfeiture proceedings).
24. United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 249 (1980).
25. See Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617 (1960) (stating that clear intent is
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has stated that evidence of a punitive effect must be shown by “the clearest
proof.”26
In Mendoza-Martinez, the Supreme Court laid out the factors to be
considered when deciding whether a particular sanction is penal.27 The
Court held that statutes divesting Americans of their citizenship for having
fled the country to evade military service were punitive.28 While the Court
recognized the power of Congress to conduct war and regulate foreign
relations, this power was subject to the constitutional requirement of due
process.29 In assessing whether divestment of citizenship constituted
punishment, the Court looked to whether the statutes were penal in
character.30 The Court determined that Congress did, in fact, impose the
sanction as punishment.31 When conclusive evidence of Congressional
intent does not exist, the Court indicated that the following factors “must be
considered in relation to the statute on its face”32:
[w]hether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint,
whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment, whether it
comes into play only on a finding of scienter, whether its operation will
promote the traditional aims of punishment—retribution and deterrence,
whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime, whether an
alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable
for it, whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternate purpose.33

The Supreme Court later stated that while the Mendoza-Martinez factors
are meant to serve as guideposts,34 “no one factor should be considered
controlling.”35 However, courts continue to apply these factors in their
analyses of whether a penalty is punitive or remedial.36 Therefore, I will
necessary to demonstrate that a statute is punitive even though labeled civil).
26. Id.
27. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168–69.
28. Id. at 180–82.
29. Id. at 164–65.
30. Id. at 164.
31. Id. at 165–66.
32. Id. at 169.
33. Id. at 168–69 (citations omitted).
34. Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 99 (1997).
35. Id. at 101.
36. See, e.g., Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 97 (2003) (using the Mendoza-Martinez
factors to determine whether Alaska’s Sex Offender Registration Act was punitive and
violated the Ex Post Facto Clause); Hudson, 522 U.S. at 99–100 (criminal and civil
punishment for banking violations); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 362 (1997)
(Sexually Violent Predator Act); Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.,
492 U.S. 257, 298 (1989) (jury award of punitive damages); Simmons v. Galvin, 575 F.3d
24, 44 (1st Cir. 2009) (state constitutional amendment disenfranchising felons); Smith v.
Dinwiddie, 510 F.3d 1180, 1189 (10th Cir. 2007) (civil loss of parental rights); Doe v.
Bredesen, 507 F.3d 998, 1004–05 (6th Cir. 2007) (violent sexual offender registration);
United States v. Reynard, 473 F.3d 1008, 1020–21 (9th Cir. 2007) (requirement that
parolees submit blood samples for DNA testing); Porter v. Coughlin, 421 F.3d 141, 147–48
(2d Cir. 2005) (prison disciplinary proceedings); Myrie v. Comm’r, 267 F.3d 251, 259–62
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use these factors in Part IV.B to demonstrate that the deportation of lawful
permanent residents is punishment.37
B. Deportation Proceedings: Classification as Civil and Non-penal, a
Historical Perspective
The courts have reflexively dismissed the application of constitutional
criminal safeguards to deportation proceedings on the basis that such
proceedings are civil and not criminal38 and on the basis that deportation
does not constitute punishment.39 This reflexive tendency to label
deportation cases as non-punitive seems antithetical to the MendozaMartinez factors and case law in which the Court has found other civil
penalties to be punitive.
In the 1893 case of Fong Yue Ting v. United States,40 the Supreme Court
had its first occasion to consider whether constitutional criminal protections
should be afforded to noncitizens in deportation proceedings.41 Fong Yue
Ting involved Section 6 of the Act of May 5, 1892, which was ‘“[a]n act to
prohibit the coming of Chinese persons into the United States.’”42 Under
Section 6, any Chinese laborer living in the United States who had not

(3d Cir. 2001) (mandatory surcharge in prison commissary to fund victim compensation
program).
37. Despite the guideposts laid down by Mendoza-Martinez and its progeny, the Court’s
jurisprudence in this area has been described as a “jurisprudential Frankenstein’s monster.”
Fellmeth, supra note 14, at 10. The Court has “vacillated” in its distinction between
criminal and civil measures, as well its definition of the term punitive. Id. Moreover, the
Court’s analysis has differed based upon the specific Constitutional provision in question.
Id.; see also Hudson, 522 U.S. at 102–03 (finding that not all punishment is subject to
double jeopardy constraints and that other constitutional protections can address punishment
that is disproportionate or irrational).
38. See, e.g., Nijhawan v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2294, 2303 (2009) (stating that deportation
is civil and government does not have to apply the proof beyond a reasonable doubt
standard); Rajah v. Mukasey, 544 F.3d 427, 442 (2d Cir. 2008) (asserting that deportation
proceedings are civil); Ngongo v. Ashcroft, 397 F.3d 821, 823 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting that
deportation proceedings are civil and, therefore, certain constitutional criminal protections
are not available); De La Teja v. United States, 321 F.3d 1357, 1364–65 (11th Cir. 2003)
(declaring that deportation proceedings are civil, so the Double Jeopardy Clause does not
apply).
39. See, e.g., Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 491 (1999)
(stating that the while the consequences of deportation are “grave,” deportation is “not
imposed as a punishment”); Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585, 591 (1913) (holding that
deportation is not punishment but “simply a refusal by the government to harbor persons
whom it does not want”); Elia v. Gonzales, 431 F.3d 268, 276 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding that
the Eighth Amendment does not apply because deportation does not constitute punishment);
Flores-Leon v. INS, 272 F.3d 433, 440 (7th Cir. 2001) (stating that the Ex Post Facto Clause
and petitioner’s Eighth Amendment claim of cruel and unusual punishment do not apply in
removal proceedings, which are civil proceedings, “not criminal punishment”); Cortez v.
INS, 395 F.2d 965, 968 (5th Cir. 1968) (stating that “deportation is not punishment” and
“therefore cannot constitute cruel and unusual punishment”).
40. 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
41. Id. at 730.
42. Id. at 725.
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obtained a certificate of residence within one year of the act’s passage was
deemed unlawfully present and ordered deported by a judge.43 The
Chinese resident could prevent his deportation if he could show that he was
unable to obtain a certificate because of “accident, sickness, or other
unavoidable cause” and demonstrate “by at least one credible white
witness” that he was a resident.44
Fong Yue Ting involved three Chinese laborers who had been arrested
and ordered deported under Section 6.45 Each filed a petition alleging that
his arrest violated due process and that Section 6 was unconstitutional.46
The Supreme Court found that the power to exclude and expel aliens from
United States territory was within Congress’s plenary powers.47 According
to the Court, Chinese laborers could reside permanently in the United
States, but they “remain[ed] subject to the power of [C]ongress to expel
them, or to order them to be removed and deported from the country,
whenever, in its judgment, their removal [was] necessary or expedient for
the public interest.”48 The Court noted that the hearing before the judge
under Section 6 was not a trial or sentence for a criminal offense, but
simply a determination as to whether the individual met the conditions
established by Congress to remain in the United States.49 The Court further
elaborated:
[i]t is not a banishment, in the sense in which that word is often applied
to the expulsion of a citizen from his country by way of punishment. It
is but a method of enforcing the return to his own county of an alien who
has not complied with the conditions upon the performance of which the
government of the nation, acting within its constitutional authority, and
through the proper departments, has determined that his continuing to
reside here shall depend. He has not, therefore, been deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law; and the provisions of the
[C]onstitution, securing the right of trial by jury, and prohibiting
unreasonable searches and seizures and cruel and unusual punishments,
have no application.50

Justices Brewer and Field wrote compelling dissents.51 Justice Brewer
distinguished between those persons lawfully admitted and those who had

43. Id. at 726–27.
44. Id. at 727.
45. Id. at 731–32.
46. Id. at 704.
47. Id. at 713–14.
48. Id. at 724.
49. Id. at 730.
50. Id.
51. Justice Fuller also dissented, stating that deportation was akin to banishment, and
that the specific provisions of the act constituted punishment without a judicial trial. Id. at
762–63 (Fuller, J., dissenting).
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not been admitted.52 He stated that the three lawfully admitted petitioners
in this case, because of their lengthy residence within the country, were
“entitled to a more distinct and larger measure of protection than those who
[were] simply passing through, or temporarily in [the country].”53 Resident
aliens, Justice Brewer asserted, were protected by the Constitution, and the
deportation of lawfully admitted residents without a trial imposed
punishment without due process of law.54
Justice Field agreed with Justice Brewer that deportation constituted
punishment.55 He described deportation as “beyond all reason in its
severity.”56 Justice Field stated that deportation could not be carried out
without the protections of the Constitution.57 Those residents domiciled
here were entitled to the same constitutional protections as citizens.58 The
only difference between lawfully admitted residents and citizens, he said,
was that the former could not vote or hold public office.59 Justice Field
noted: “[t]here is no dispute about the power of [C]ongress to prevent the
landing of aliens in the country. The question is as to the power of
[C]ongress to deport them, without regard to the guaranties of the
[C]onstitution.”60 Finding deportation of Chinese laborers under Section 6
of the act to be “of an infamous character,” Justice Field said that such a
punishment could “only be imposed after indictment, trial, and
conviction.”61 He went on to note that if such a punishment had been
applied to a citizen, “none of the justices of this court would hesitate a
moment to pronounce it illegal.”62
Adhering to the precedent set by Fong Yue Ting, in 1913 the Court in
Bugajewitz v. Adams63 once again found that deportation did not constitute
punishment.64 Bugajewitz involved a woman who faced deportation under
the Act of February 20, 1907.65 According to the act, any alien woman
found to be practicing prostitution within three years after entry was
deportable.66 In holding that the act was constitutional, the Court stated
that deportation was not punishment but simply “a refusal by the

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id. at 733–37 (Brewer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 734.
Id. at 739–41.
Id. at 758–59 (Field, J., dissenting).
Id. at 759.
Id. at 753–54.
Id. at 754.
Id.
Id. at 756–57.
Id. at 758–59.
Id. at 759.
228 U.S. 585 (1913).
Id. at 591.
Id. at 590.
Id.
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government to harbor persons whom it does not want.”67
In 1924, in Mahler v. Eby,68 the petitioners were found deportable for
having violated the Act of May 10, 1920—“‘An act to punish acts of
interference with the foreign relations, the neutrality, and the foreign
commerce of the United States, to punish espionage, and better to enforce
the criminal laws of the United States, and for other purposes.’”69
Petitioners argued that their convictions were for actions committed prior
to the act’s passage, and that their deportations would violate the
constitutional prohibition on ex post facto laws.70 While the Court
acknowledged that deportation was “burdensome and severe,” it stated that
deportation did not constitute punishment.71 According to the Court,
Congress, in passing the Act of May 10, 1920, was not “increasing the
punishment for the crimes” but was simply “seeking to rid the country of
persons who had shown by their career that their continued presence here
would not make for the safety or welfare of society.”72 The Court also
stated that the constitutional ban on ex post facto laws applied only to
criminal law and not to civil deportation proceedings.73
In 1951, Justice Jackson, dissenting in Jordan v. De George,74 called into
question the civil/non-punitive label of deportation and the denial of
constitutional criminal protections during deportation proceedings.75 The
respondent, who had lived in the United States for thirty years, faced
deportation because he had twice been convicted of crimes of moral
turpitude (an immigration term of art).76 The majority held that conspiracy
to defraud the United States of taxes on distilled spirits was a crime of
moral turpitude that warranted deportation.77 Justice Jackson’s dissent, on
the other hand, emphasized the fact that when deportation proceedings are
triggered by a criminal conviction, they are an extension of the criminal
process and deportation is part of the punishment imposed.78 Justice
Jackson stated:
[d]eportation proceedings technically are not criminal; but practically
they are for they extend the criminal process of sentencing to include on
the same convictions an additional punishment of deportation. If
respondent were a citizen, his aggregate sentences of three years and a
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id. at 591.
264 U.S. 32 (1924).
Id. at 35–36.
Id. at 37.
Id. at 39 (citing Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893)).
Id.
Id. (citing Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390 (1798)).
341 U.S. 223 (1951).
Id. at 243 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
Id. at 224–25 (majority opinion).
Id. at 224–25, 229.
Id. at 243 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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day would have been served long since and his punishment ended. But
because of his alienage, he is about to begin a life sentence of exile from
what has become home, of separation from his established means of
livelihood for himself and his family of American citizens. This is a
savage penalty and we believe due process of law requires standards for
imposing it as definite and certain as those for conviction of crime.79

A year later, Harisiades v. Shaughnessy80 involved deportation
proceedings that had been initiated against petitioners for violation of the
Alien Registration Act of 1940 because of membership in the Communist
party.81 The Court held, in part, that the act did not deprive the petitioners
of due process under the law, nor was it invalid under the Ex Post Facto
Clause.82 The Court recognized that deportation had been exercised with
“increasing severity,” as the grounds for deportation had expanded.83 In
spite of its severity, the Court reasoned that the threat of communism was a
heavy a burden on citizens and that the authority to deport noncitizens was
within Congress’s power to protect the nation from these threats.84 The
Court further noted that “it would be rash and irresponsible to reinterpret
our fundamental law to deny or qualify the Government’s power of
deportation.”85
Finally, the Court reiterated once again that the
constitutional ban on ex post facto laws applied only to criminal cases.86
While the petitioners cited to civil cases in which the Court had previously
found that the ban on ex post facto laws did apply, the Court in Harisiades
distinguished those cases by stating that they involved criminal penalties
“for which civil form was a disguise.”87 Deportation, according to the
Court, was not a criminal penalty disguised as a civil sanction.88
In the 1954 decision Galvan v. Press,89 the Court held that a noncitizen
who was a member of the Communist party was deportable.90 The
petitioner’s membership in the party occurred prior to the passage of the
Internal Security Act of 1950, which made it a deportable offense to be a
member of the Communist party.91 While upholding the constitutionality
of the law, Justice Frankfurter expressed discontent with the result,

79. Id.
80. 342 U.S. 580 (1952).
81. Id. at 581–83.
82. Id. at 591, 594.
83. Id. at 588.
84. Id. at 591.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 594–95 (citing Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32, 39 (1924); Johannessen v. United
States, 225 U.S. 227, 242 (1912); Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390 (1798)).
87. Id. at 595 (citing Burgess v. Salmon, 97 U.S. 381, 385 (1878)).
88. Id.
89. 347 U.S. 522 (1954).
90. Id. at 523, 531–32.
91. Id. at 523.
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emphasizing the drastic nature of deportation.92 “And since the intrinsic
consequences of deportation are so close to punishment for crime, it might
fairly be said also that the ex post facto Clause, even though applicable
only to punitive legislation, should be applied to deportation.”93 Since the
“slate [was] not clean,” however, the Court adhered to precedent,
concluding that the “unbroken rule” of the Court had been that the Ex Post
Facto Clause did not apply to deportation.94
Thus, despite the slight wavering in the logic behind labeling deportation
as a civil, not punitive process—shown in Galvan and the dissent in
Jordan—the Supreme Court has remained steadfast in holding that
deportation is not punishment.95 Because of this view, the Court has denied
constitutional criminal protections to noncitizens in removal proceedings.
As such, in the deportation context, courts have concluded that the
prohibition on ex post facto laws do not apply,96 the exclusionary rule does
not apply,97 the Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel does not
apply,98 the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishments
does not apply,99 and the prohibition on double jeopardy does not apply.100
92. Id. at 530 (quoting Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948)).
93. Id. at 531.
94. Id.
95. While the Supreme Court rejected the categorization of deportation as a criminal
proceeding in Harisiades, the Court has seemed to at least acknowledge that deportation
may be criminal punishment in other cases. See United States v. Spector, 343 U.S. 169, 178
(1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“Administrative determinations of liability to deportation
have been sustained as constitutional only by considering them to be exclusively civil in
nature, with no criminal consequences or connotations. That doctrine, early adopted against
sharp dissent has been adhered to with increasing logical difficulty as new causes for
deportation, based not on illegal entry but on conduct after admittance, have been added,
and the period within which deportation proceedings may be instituted has been
extended.”); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 154 (1945) (“Though deportation is not
technically a criminal proceeding, it visits a great hardship on the individual and deprives
him of the right to stay and live and work in this land of freedom. That deportation is a
penalty—at times a most serious one—cannot be doubted. Meticulous care must be
exercised lest the procedure by which he is deprived of that liberty not meet the essential
standards of fairness.”).
96. See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 594 (1952) (noting that the
constitutional ban on ex post facto laws does not apply since “[d]eportation, however severe
its consequences, has been consistently classified as a civil rather than a criminal
procedure”); see also Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32, 39 (1924) (citing Bugajewitz v. Adams,
228 U.S. 585, 591 (1913); Johannessen v. United States, 225 U.S. 227, 242 (1912); Calder
v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390 (1798)) (declaring the ban on ex post facto laws
inapplicable, since Congress was not punishing petitioners for certain acts but only ridding
the country of undesirables).
97. See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1034–35, 1050 (1984) (holding that
admission of unlawful presence in the United States during an unlawful arrest cannot be
excluded from a deportation hearing).
98. Xu Yong Lu v. Ashcroft, 259 F.3d 127, 131 (3d Cir. 2001).
99. Elia v. Gonzales, 431 F.3d 268, 276 (6th Cir. 2005) (stating that the Eighth
Amendment is “inapplicable” because deportation does not constitute punishment); FloresLeon v. INS, 272 F.3d 433, 440 (7th Cir. 2001) (asserting that the Eighth Amendment does
not apply in removal proceedings, which are civil proceedings, “not criminal punishment”);
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II. HARSH IMMIGRATION LAWS HAVE INCREASINGLY TIED THE
IMMIGRATION PROCESS WITH THE CRIMINAL PROCESS
This Part will explore the changes in immigration law since the Supreme
Court’s decision in Fong Yue Ting. Quite simply, the list of crimes
resulting in deportation has expanded, while Congress has taken away
many forms of discretionary relief. With the expansion of crimes leading
to deportation, the immigration system has become more and more
integrated into the criminal justice system. Additionally, immigration
enforcement has trickled down to the local level. This has resulted in local
law enforcement entering into agreements with U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE) to enforce immigration laws. This creeping
expansion of immigration proceedings into criminal matters suggests a
need for change in the law pertaining to deportation.101
A. The Expansion of Criminal Grounds for Deportation and the Removal
of Discretionary Forms of Relief
Early in the twentieth century, Congress began to deport noncitizens for
criminal behavior. These early laws, however, were tempered with
discretion—if a noncitizen met certain conditions, he could apply to have
his deportation suspended. As the Padilla Court noted, “[e]ven as the class
of deportable offenses expanded, judges retained discretion to ameliorate
unjust results on a case-by-case basis.”102 This is no longer the case. Over
the years, more and more crimes have been added to the list of deportable
offenses, but Congress has steadily reduced the forms of discretionary
relief available.
In 1917, for the first time, U.S. immigration laws allowed for the
deportation of noncitizens who committed certain crimes.103 Specifically,
an alien imprisoned for one year or more based upon a conviction for a

Cortez v. INS, 395 F.2d 965, 967–68 (5th Cir. 1968) (emphasizing that deportation is not
punishment and therefore cannot constitute cruel and unusual punishment).
100. See De La Teja v. United States, 321 F.3d 1357, 1364–65 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding
that the Double Jeopardy Clause applies only to proceedings that are “essentially criminal,”
and deportation is “purely civil” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
101. See generally Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law, supra note 4 (arguing
that the adoption of criminal methods in the immigration context, while immigration law has
rejected the application of procedural protections, has resulted in an asymmetric
incorporation of criminal justice into the immigration system); Stumpf, supra note 4
(exploring the convergence of criminal and immigration law and arguing that the goals of
both are to exclude and alienate certain members of the population); Sweeney, supra note 4
(arguing that the changes in immigration law that have made deportation a direct
consequence of a conviction have destroyed the factual and doctrinal foundation which has
formed the basis for legal decisions asserting that deportation is not punishment).
102. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1479 (2010).
103. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 64-301, § 19, 39 Stat. 874,
889 (1917) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (2006)).
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crime of moral turpitude committed within five years after entry into the
United States was deportable.104 Noncitizens who committed two or more
crimes of moral turpitude after entry were also deportable.105 At the same
time, this legislation was tempered with judicial discretion—a sentencing
judge could recommend that an individual not be deported, and such
recommendations were binding.106 This procedure was known as a Judicial
Recommendation Against Deportation (JRAD).107
In 1952, Congress again passed harsh legislation, but it also contained an
important form of discretionary relief. The legislation excluded certain
aliens from entering the United States on account of criminal behavior.108
However, a lawful permanent resident who had lived in the United States
consecutively for seven years, who had traveled abroad, and who faced
inadmissibility, could apply for what was called section 212(c) relief.109
While initially this relief only applied to lawful permanent residents
seeking readmission, it was broadened so that lawful permanent residents
in deportation proceedings could apply.110
Toward the end of the twentieth century, Congress continued to expand
the criminal grounds that could result in deportation. But unlike the
legislation previously mentioned, these harsh laws were not tempered by
discretionary relief. In 1988, Congress introduced the “aggravated felony”
category as a basis for deporting noncitizens.111 While initially the crimes
constituting an aggravated felony were limited to murder, any drug
trafficking crime, or any illicit trafficking in firearms or destructive
devices,112 over time the aggravated felony category “accounted for the
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 889–90 (stating “nor shall such deportation be made or directed if the court, or
judge thereof, sentencing such alien for such crime shall, at the time of imposing judgment
or passing sentence or within thirty days thereafter, due notice having first been given to
representatives of the State, make a recommendation to the Secretary of Labor that such
alien shall not be deported in pursuance of this Act”).
107. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1479.
108. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 212, 66 Stat. 163,
182–87 (1952) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). Section 212 of the
1952 Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) excluded classes of aliens, including those
convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude, those convicted of two or more crimes for
which the aggregate sentences to confinement were five years or more, and those convicted
of drug trafficking offenses. Id. at 182, 184.
109. Id. at 187. Section 212(c) relief was similar to a form of discretionary relief
available under the 1917 legislation, which provided “[t]hat aliens returning after a
temporary absence to an unrelinquished United States domicile of seven consecutive years
may be admitted in the discretion of the Secretary of Labor, and under such conditions as he
may prescribe.” See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1917, § 19, 39 Stat. at 878.
110. Silva, 16 I. & N. Dec. 26, 30 (B.I.A. 1976) (adopting position of Francis v. INS,
532 F.2d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 1976)).
111. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, §§ 7342–43, 102 Stat. 4181,
4469–70 (1988) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
112. Id.
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steadiest and most expansive growth in the range of crimes that give rise to
removal.”113 Today, many different crimes have been designated as
aggravated felonies, including the following: forgery (when the term of
imprisonment is at least one year), drug offenses, theft (when the term of
imprisonment is at least one year), illegal re-entry after deportation,
conspiracy to commit an aggravated felony, attempt to commit an
aggravated felony, failure to appear to serve a sentence if the underlying
offense is punishable by a term of five years, and failure to face charges if
the underlying sentence is punishable by two years.114
As the criminal grounds resulting in deportation continued to expand,
discretionary relief was summarily stripped away. In 1990, Congress
narrowed the scope of the previously mentioned section 212(c) relief,
excluding from eligibility anyone convicted of an aggravated felony who
served a term of imprisonment of at least five years.115 The judicial
discretion—JRAD—allowed under the 1917 legislation was also taken
away that same year.116
In 1996, Congress passed the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act117 (AEDPA) and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act118 (IIRIRA), which were arguably the most drastic and
harsh changes made to our immigration laws. These laws made it even
more likely that criminal behavior would result in deportation. Congress
expanded the crimes constituting aggravated felonies, and it named other
crimes for which one could be deported.119 The term of imprisonment
required for certain crimes to be categorized as aggravated felonies under
immigration law was also reduced.120 IIRIRA broadened the definition of a
“term of imprisonment,” defining it as the “incarceration or confinement
ordered by a court of law regardless of any suspension of the imposition or
execution of that imprisonment or sentence in whole or in part”121 and also
broadened the definition of a conviction to even include the admission of

113. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law, supra note 4, at 483.
114. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2006).
115. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 511, 104 Stat. 4978, 5052 (1990)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
116. Id. § 505, 104 Stat. at 5050.
117. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110
Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 15, 18, 21, 22, 28, 40, 42,
49, and 50 U.S.C.).
118. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, 20,
22, 28, 32, 42, 48, and 50 U.S.C.).
119. AEDPA § 440, 110 Stat. at 1278–79; IIRIRA § 321, 110 Stat. at 3009-627 to 28.
This Article will later discuss additional grounds of inadmissibility and deportability. Infra
Part II.C.
120. IIRIRA § 321, 110 Stat. at 3009-627 to 28.
121. Id. § 322, 110 Stat. at 3009-628 to 29 (emphasis added).
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sufficient facts to warrant a finding of guilt.122
At the same time that the grounds for deportation greatly expanded,
discretionary relief did not. A lawful permanent resident convicted of an
aggravated felony was now automatically deportable with no ability to
apply for discretionary relief.123 As the Padilla Court explained,
Under contemporary law, if a noncitizen has committed a removable
offense after the 1996 effective date of these amendments, his removal is
practically inevitable but for the possible exercise of limited remnants of
equitable discretion vested in the Attorney General to cancel removal for
noncitizens convicted of particular classes of offenses.124

B. Enforcement of Immigration Laws in Federal Court and by Law
Enforcement Officials Has Increased to a Level Not Envisioned by the
Fong Yue Ting Court
While the number of crimes giving rise to deportation has increased, the
immigration and criminal systems have become linked in other ways. As
this section will describe, federal district court judges can order
deportation, and certain immigration violations are prosecuted in federal
court. Additionally, local law enforcement officials now have broad
authority to enforce immigration laws.
In 1994, the authority to order deportation was no longer limited to
administrative immigration judges. Instead, federal district court judges
were given the authority during the sentencing phase of criminal
proceedings to order the deportation of noncitizens.125 Upon the request of
the U.S. Attorney and within the discretion of the court, a judge can order
the removal of an alien who is deportable.126 Either party can appeal this
decision to the appropriate court of appeals.127 Should a court deny the
122. Id. at 3009-628 (stating that if an adjudication of guilt has been withheld, it can still
be a conviction where “a judge or jury has found the alien guilty or the alien has entered a
plea of guilty or nolo contendere or has admitted sufficient facts to warrant a finding of
guilt, and . . . the judge has ordered some form of punishment, penalty, or restraint on the
alien’s liberty to be imposed”); see also MARY E. KRAMER, IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES OF
CRIMINAL ACTIVITY: A GUIDE TO REPRESENTING FOREIGN-BORN DEFENDANTS 45 (Stephanie
L. Browning ed., 2005) (“Criminal law statutes at both state and federal levels contain
various types of procedures, from deferred adjudications to sealings to vacaturs, which
purport to avoid or eliminate a conviction for most purposes. However, immigration law,
via statute and case law, takes an independent approach to the term ‘conviction,’ and hence,
to the various types of adjudication procedures.”).
123. IIRIRA § 240A, 110 Stat. at 3009-594 (replacing section 212(c) with a form of
discretionary relief called “cancellation of removal” and making ineligible lawful permanent
residents convicted of an aggravated felony).
124. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1480 (2010).
125. Immigration and Nationality Technical Corrections Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103416, § 224, 108 Stat. 4305, 4322–24 (1994) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8
U.S.C.).
126. 8 U.S.C. § 1228(c) (2006).
127. Id. § 1228(c)(3).
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U.S. Attorney’s request for a judicial order of removal, the Attorney
General can still initiate removal proceedings in immigration court.128 This
authority was expanded in 1996, and as part of the expansion, deportation
could serve as a condition of probation or a plea agreement.129
Additionally, certain immigration violations are prosecuted in federal
court. For example, noncitizens may be prosecuted in federal court for
entry at an improper time or place, as well as for reentry into the United
States following an order of deportation.130 The number of prosecutions in
federal court is astounding. During the first nine months of fiscal year
2009, there were 40,050 prosecutions for improper time or place entries.131
That same year, there were 21,892 prosecutions for reentry violations.132
Outside of federal court, immigration laws are now enforced at a local
level by local law enforcement officials. The 1996 laws created a system
for identifying criminal aliens, which included coordinating the efforts of
federal, state, and local authorities.133 As a result, local law enforcement
officials across the United States have entered into a paper agreement
referred to as a “Memorandum of Agreement,” which provides the
“necessary resources and latitude to pursue investigations relating to
violent crimes, human smuggling, gang/organized crime activity, sexualrelated offenses, narcotics smuggling and money laundering . . . and
increased resources and support in more remote geographical locations.”134
Under this program, local law enforcement officials are authorized to
perform immigration enforcement functions.135
128. Id. § 1228(c)(4).
129. See id. § 1228(c)(5) (“The United States Attorney, with the concurrence of the
Commissioner, may, pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11, enter into a plea
agreement which calls for the alien, who is deportable under this chapter, to waive the right
to notice and a hearing under this section, and stipulate to the entry of a judicial order of
deportation from the United States as a condition of the plea agreement or as a condition of
probation or supervised release, or both. The United States district court, in both felony and
misdemeanor cases, and a United States magistrate judge in misdemeanor cases, may accept
such a stipulation and shall have jurisdiction to enter a judicial order of deportation pursuant
to the terms of such stipulation.”); IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 374, 110 Stat. 3009,
3009-647 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, 20, 22, 28, 32, 42, 48,
and 50 U.S.C.).
130. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1325–26 (2006) (designating civil and criminal penalties for
improper entry or re-entry).
131. See Immigration Prosecutions at Record Levels in FY 2009, TRANSACTIONAL
RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE (TRAC), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/218/
(last visited Aug. 29, 2010).
132. Id.
133. See IIRIRA § 303, 110 Stat. at 3009-586; AEDPA, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 439, 110
Stat. 1214, 1276 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 15, 18, 21, 22, 28,
40, 42, 49, and 50 U.S.C.).
134. See Fact Sheet: Delegation of Immigration Authority Section 287(g) Immigration
and Nationality Act, UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, available
at http://www.ice.gov/news/library/factsheets/287g.htm. These agreements are authorized
under section 287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Id.
135. Immigration and Nationality Act § 287(g), 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2006).
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Along the same lines, an authorized immigration officer can place a
detainer on an individual in the custody of a local jail.136 “A detainer
serves to advise another law enforcement agency that the Department seeks
custody of an alien presently in the custody of that agency, for the purpose
of arresting and removing the alien.”137 Under this authority, ICE
coordinates with local jails to hold individuals who have a detainer placed
on them for an additional amount of time.138 Under a detainer, local jails
can hold an individual for only forty-eight hours, excluding weekends and
holidays.139 For instance, an individual detained in a state jail who has paid
bond would normally be released from custody. However, if an ICE
detainer is placed on the individual, the jail can hold her for an additional
forty-eight hours, allowing time for ICE to assume custody. While the
statute provides that individuals cannot be held longer than forty-eight
hours, local jails have held individuals beyond the statutorily allowable
forty-eight hour period.140
The huge expansion of the crimes giving rise to deportation and the
enforcement of immigration laws at all levels of the criminal justice system
demonstrate that immigration enforcement is now deeply connected to the
criminal justice system. This has indeed resulted in the “crimmigration”
As Julie Stumpf appropriately states, “the trend toward
crisis.141
criminalizing immigration law has set us on a path toward establishing
irrevocably intertwined systems: immigration and criminal law as
doppelgangers.”142
III. PADILLA V. KENTUCKY: A NEW CHAPTER IN SUPREME COURT
JURISPRUDENCE
A. Summary of Decision
Padilla involved a lawful permanent resident by the name of Jose
Padilla.143 Padilla had lived in the United States for more than forty years
when he was placed in removal proceedings after pleading guilty to the

136. 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(a) (2010).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. § 287.7(d).
140. See Felisa Cardona, ACLU Sues Jeffco Sheriff over Lengthy ICE Hold, DENVER
POST, Apr. 22, 2010, http://www.denverpost.com/news/ci_14932928 (last visited Sept. 13,
2011); Justin Leighty, Lawsuit: LaGrange Sheriff Held Woman in Immigration Case Too
Long, ETRUTH.COM (June 21, 2010) (on file with Law Review), http://www.etruth.com/
Know/News/Story.aspx?ID=516209.
141. See generally Stumpf, supra note 4 (explaining that immigration law and criminal
law have converged so much as to blur the distinction between them).
142. Id. at 378.
143. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1477 (2010).
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transportation of a large amount of marijuana.144 According to the statute
at issue,
Any alien who at any time after admission has been convicted of a
violation of (or a conspiracy or attempt to violate) any law or regulation
of a State, the United States, or a foreign country relating to a controlled
substance . . . , other than a single offense involving possession for one’s
own use of 30 grams or less of marijuana is deportable.145

Padilla claimed that his counsel did not advise him that pleading guilty
to the drug offense could result in deportation.146 Instead, Padilla was told
by his attorney that he “did not have to worry about immigration status
since he had been in the country so long.”147
The Kentucky Supreme Court denied Padilla’s Sixth Amendment claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel.148 The court held that a criminal
defendant who is provided erroneous information about deportation is not
protected under the Sixth Amendment because deportation is a collateral
consequence of the conviction.149 Thus, the court viewed deportation as
outside the penal sanction, and, therefore, a noncitizen criminal defendant
could not raise a Sixth Amendment claim for a matter outside of the
criminal punishment imposed.
In reversing the Kentucky Supreme Court, the United States Supreme
Court held that counsel must inform a client when a plea carries a risk of
deportation.150 Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, cited to Strickland
v. Washington,151 where the Court had previously held that a defendant is
entitled to “‘the effective assistance of competent counsel.’”152 The Padilla
Court found that Padilla’s counsel’s advice had fallen “‘below an objective
standard of reasonableness.’”153 The majority concluded that advice
regarding the immigration consequences of a plea must be provided when
the law is clear.154 When the law “is not succinct and straightforward,”

144. Id. Padilla was placed in removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i).
Id. at 1477–78 n.1.
145. Id. at 1483 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i)
(2006)).
146. Id. at 1478 (citing Commonwealth v. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d 482, 483 (Ky. 2008)).
147. Id. (quoting Padilla, 253 S.W.3d at 483) (internal quotation marks omitted).
148. Id. (citing Padilla, 253 S.W.3d at 485).
149. Id. (citing Padilla, 253 S.W.3d at 485).
150. Id. at 1486.
151. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
152. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1480–81 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686; McMann v.
Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970)).
153. Id. at 1482, 1486–87 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688). The Padilla decision
did not decide the second Strickland prong—whether because of counsel’s errors, there was
a “reasonable probability” that the result would have been different. Id. at 1483–84.
Instead, the Court remanded the case to determine the second part of the Strickland inquiry.
Id.
154. Id. at 1483.
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however, a defense attorney need only inform her client that criminal
charges could carry a risk of adverse immigration consequences.155
Justice Alito, writing a concurring opinion, asserted that an attorney
cannot misadvise a client about the immigration consequences of a plea.156
Unlike the majority, however, the concurrence did not find that an attorney
must affirmatively advise a client when a plea carries the risk of
deportation. The concurrence stated that an attorney’s obligation in
providing effective assistance of counsel requires two things. First, an
attorney cannot misadvise a client regarding the immigration consequences
of a guilty plea.157 Second, an attorney should inform his client that there
could be adverse immigration consequences.158 As such, a client should
seek the advice of an immigration expert about these possible
consequences.159 Because immigration law is so complex, Justice Alito
indicated that the majority’s requirement that a criminal defense attorney
provide advice concerning such a specific area of law imposes a significant
“burden” on defense counsel.160
B. The Padilla Language Supports an Argument that Deportation is
Punishment
The reasoning used to arrive at the holding in Padilla provides a logical
pathway to conclude that deportation can be punishment. First, through its
discussion of whether deportation is a direct or collateral consequence of a
plea, the Padilla Court illustrated that deportation resembles a direct
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1494 (Alito, J., concurring). Chief Justice Roberts joined in the concurring
opinion. Id. at 1487. Justices Scalia and Thomas dissented. Id. at 1494 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). The dissent argued that the Sixth Amendment did not require counsel to inform
a client of collateral consequences—such as deportation—and that affirmative misadvice is
also not constitutionally inadequate. Id. at 1495–96. The dissent argued that the majority’s
holding had “no logical stopping-point.” Id. at 1496. The dissent noted, “[w]e could expect
years of elaboration upon these new issues in the lower courts, prompted by the defense
bar’s devising of ever-expanding categories of plea-invalidating misadvice and failures to
warn—not to mention innumerable evidentiary hearings to determine whether misadvice
really occurred or whether the warning was really given.” Id. The dissent criticized the
concurrence’s concern for affirmative misadvice, stating that this stemmed more from a
concern over the voluntariness of the defendant’s plea, which relates to the Due Process
Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, rather than the Sixth Amendment. Id.
(citations omitted). The dissent found that legislative changes would be more effective in
terms of determining “which categories of misadvice about matters ancillary to the
prosecution invalidate plea agreements, what collateral consequences counsel must bring to
a defendant’s attention, and what warnings must be given.” Id. The dissent also noted that
legislation could provide for the consequences of misadvice, nonadvice or failure to warn.
Id. at 1496–97. One possible consequence—rather than nullification of the conviction—
could be that the near-automatic removal would not apply. Id. at 1497.
157. Id. at 1487 (Alito, J., concurring).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 1490.
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consequence of a plea and is part of the criminal punishment imposed on
noncitizen criminal defendants. Second, in emphasizing the severity of
deportation, the Padilla decision demonstrated the punitive nature of
deportation, particularly for lawful permanent residents. If deportation is
considered a direct consequence of a plea and is viewed as severe, then
deportation must be considered punitive. Moreover, the language used in
Padilla suggests that removal proceedings following a criminal conviction
are quasi-criminal.
It must be noted upfront that the Court stated deportation was “civil in
nature” and “not, in a strict sense, a criminal sanction.”161 This, of course,
reflects the Court’s adherence to over a century’s worth of precedent on the
matter. As will be detailed below, the analysis provided throughout the
decision actually illustrates that deportation is punitive in nature.
1.

Deportation resembles a direct consequence of a plea—one that is
part of the punishment imposed
a.

Background regarding direct and collateral consequences

This Section will argue that when deportation is viewed as a direct
consequence of a plea, then deportation is considered part of the criminal
punishment imposed, and should be viewed as punitive.
The Kentucky Supreme Court denied Padilla’s ineffective assistance of
counsel claim on the basis that deportation was not a direct consequence of
a plea. Rather, the court considered it to be a collateral matter outside of
the sentencing authority of the court and therefore a matter for which
counsel was not obligated to inform his client.162 The U.S. Supreme Court,
while not deciding whether deportation is a direct or collateral consequence
of a plea, disagreed with the Kentucky Supreme Court and held that under
the Sixth Amendment, counsel must inform clients when a plea will result
in deportation.163 As explained below, the Court’s dictum suggests that
deportation more closely resembles a direct consequence rather than a
collateral consequence.164
By way of background, according to the collateral consequences rule,
matters outside of the penal sanction are considered collateral, and a plea is
constitutionally valid even if a defendant is unaware of these consequences
161. Id. at 1481 (majority opinion) (citation omitted).
162. Commonwealth v. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d 482, 485 (Ky. 2008).
163. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1482, 1486–87 (“Deportation as a consequence of a criminal
conviction is, because of its close connection to the criminal process, uniquely difficult to
classify as either a direct or a collateral consequence. The collateral versus direct distinction
is thus ill-suited for evaluating a Strickland claim concerning the specific risk of
deportation.”).
164. See id. at 1481–82 (outlining deportation’s close relationship with the criminal
justice system).
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when accepting the plea.165 A defendant only needs to be informed of the
direct or penal consequences of a plea, such as jail time, probation, or a
fine.166 Matters such as deportation, sex-offender registration, loss of
voting rights, loss of employment rights, and involuntary civil commitment
as a sexually violent predator have all been considered by the courts to be
outside of the penal sanction and, therefore, collateral.167
Most federal courts have attempted to treat deportation as separate from
the criminal punishment by classifying deportation as a collateral
consequence.168 Such a classification has prevented noncitizen criminal
defendants from asserting certain constitutional rights.169 Courts have
165. Jenny Roberts, Ignorance is Effectively Bliss: Collateral Consequences, Silence,
and Misinformation in the Guilty-Plea Process, 95 IOWA L. REV. 119, 124–25 (2009)
(arguing that decisions from lower courts have created a perverse incentive structure
regarding the collateral consequences rule). Some courts have held that while an attorney
cannot misadvise a client regarding the consequences of a guilty plea, there is no affirmative
obligation to inform a client of the immigration consequences of a guilty plea. Id. at 125–
26. Such a rule, according to Roberts, encourages attorneys to remain silent and shield
themselves from any ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Id. at 126. If attorneys speak
and provide incorrect advice, then there could be an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
Id. Other courts have held that attorneys have no obligation to provide any advice
concerning the immigration consequences of a guilty plea, and even incorrect advice does
not implicate the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel because
deportation is a collateral consequence of a plea. Id. at 123 (citing Padilla, 253 S.W.3d at
485). Thus, according to Roberts, under this interpretation of the rule, attorneys encourage
their clients “‘to plead guilty through deception or outright incompetence.’” Id. at 123–24
(quoting Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 15, Padilla, 130 S. Ct. 1437 (No. 08-651)).
166. Id. at 124.
167. Id.
168. See, e.g., El-Nobani v. United States, 287 F.3d 417, 421 (6th Cir. 2002) (“[I]t is
clear that deportation is not within the control and responsibility of the district court, and
hence, deportation is collateral to a conviction.”); United States v. Amador-Leal, 276 F.3d
511, 516 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[W]hether an alien will be removed is still up to the INS. There
is a process to go through, and it is wholly independent of the court imposing sentence. . . .
Removal is not part of the sentence.”); see also United States v. Gonzalez, 202 F.3d 20, 27–
28 (1st Cir. 2000); United States v. Osiemi, 980 F.2d 344, 349 (5th Cir. 1993); United States
v. Montoya, 891 F.2d 1273, 1292–93 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v. Romero-Vilca, 850
F.2d 177, 179 (3d Cir. 1988); United States v. Campbell, 778 F.2d 764, 767 (11th Cir.
1985); United States v. Russell, 686 F.2d 35, 39 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Michel v. United States,
507 F.2d 461, 464–66 (2d Cir. 1974); Cuthrell v. Dir., Patuxent Inst., 475 F.2d 1364, 1366
(4th Cir. 1973). In United States v. Gonzalez, the appellant argued that because of recent
changes to immigration law, deportation could not be seen as a collateral consequence of a
guilty plea. Gonzalez, 202 F.3d at 26. The appellant highlighted the drastic changes under
IIRIRA which made deportation automatic following an aggravated felony conviction and
imposed mandatory detention for many convicted of crimes. Id. The Court disagreed,
holding that deportation of criminals is not enmeshed in the criminal proceeding. Id. at 27.
The Court further provided that deportation is not part of the sentence imposed and is
beyond the control of the trial court where the conviction originated. Id. (citing Fruchtman
v. Kenton, 531 F.2d 946, 949 (9th Cir. 1976)). Interestingly, the Supreme Court in Padilla
observed that the criminal conviction and the penalty of deportation have become enmeshed
and that changes in immigration law have led to a melding of the criminal and immigration
systems. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478–82.
169. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law, supra note 4, at 516 (noting that
noncitizen criminal defendants have attempted to remove a guilty plea on the ground that
the plea was not knowing, but have been prevented from doing so because deportation has
been labeled a collateral consequence).
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determined that deportation is collateral because it is not part of the
sentence imposed and it is not within the trial court’s control, but instead
within the control of another agency.170 According to Professor Stephen H.
Legomsky, the “unstated assumption” within these decisions “is that
deportation—even when imposed solely because of the person’s
commission of a crime—is not part of the punishment.”171
b. Three factors discussed in Padilla reveal that deportation is a
direct consequence of a plea
In discussing the nature of deportation with regards to the
direct/collateral distinction, the Padilla decision made three points, which
illustrate that deportation is a direct consequence of the plea and, thus,
punishment. The Padilla Court focused on the following factors: the
automatic nature of deportation,172 the fact that noncitizen criminal
defendants cannot separate the penalty of deportation from the
conviction,173 and the fact that deportation has become enmeshed with the
criminal conviction.174
i.

Deportation is largely automatic

First, the Padilla Court noted that the elimination of many forms of
discretionary remedies has made deportation an automatic result for many
noncitizens convicted of a broad range of criminal behavior.175
Consequently, it is difficult to separate deportation from the criminal
conviction.176 The emphasis on the automatic nature of deportation is
important because whether a result is automatic is one factor courts have
applied to determine whether a consequence is direct or collateral.177 For
instance, in Cuthrell v. Director, Patuxent Institution,178 a case cited by
many circuits for its discussion of the collateral consequences rule, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found that the
distinction between the direct and collateral consequences of a plea “turns
on whether the result represents a definite, immediate and largely automatic

170. See cases cited supra note 168.
171. Legomsky, The New Path Of Immigration Law, supra note 4, at 516–17.
172. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1481.
173. Id. at 1481–82.
174. Id. at 1481.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. See, e.g., United States v. Littlejohn, 224 F.3d 960, 965 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing
Torrey v. Estelle, 842 F.2d 234, 236 (9th Cir. 1988)); United States v. Lambros, 544 F.2d
962, 966 (8th Cir. 1976) (citing Cuthrell v. Dir., Patuxent Inst., 475 F.2d 1364, 1366 (4th
Cir. 1973)); see also Sweeney, supra note 4, at 47 (arguing that removal should only be
imposed when it would not be disproportionate to the underlying crime).
178. 475 F.2d 1364 (4th Cir. 1973).

MADDALI.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

10/2/2011 5:27 PM

PADILLA V. KENTUCKY: NEW CHAPTER?

27

effect on the range of the defendant’s punishment.”179
The Padilla decision took particular notice of the fact that harsh
immigration laws result in automatic deportation for noncitizens.180 As an
example, a lawful permanent resident convicted of an aggravated felony is
automatically deportable.181 The Padilla Court acknowledged that what
was described by the Supreme Court as a “‘drastic measure’ . . . is now
virtually inevitable for a vast number of noncitizens convicted of
crimes.”182 In fact, “[d]eportation is an integral part—and sometimes the
most important part—of the penalty that may be imposed.”183 Thus,
deportation is in fact “a definite, immediate and largely automatic effect on
the range of the defendant’s punishment.”184
ii.

In noncitizens’ minds, deportation is directly tied to a plea

Whether a matter is a direct or collateral consequence of a plea also turns
on the defendant’s own ideas about the consequences that are directly
related to the penal sanction. As an example, the Fourth Circuit in Cuthrell
noted that a defendant pleading guilty to a crime that makes him ineligible
for parole should be made aware of that fact.185 In holding that parole
eligibility was a direct consequence of a plea, the court noted that “the right
to parole has become so engrafted on the criminal sentence that such right
is ‘assumed by the average defendant’ and is directly related in the
defendant’s mind with the length of his sentence.”186
The consequence of deportation is “directly related in the [noncitizen]
defendant’s mind with the length of his sentence.”187 The Padilla Court
noted that noncitizen defendants find it quite difficult to separate the
penalty of deportation from the criminal conviction and that noncitizen
defendants are “acutely aware of the immigration consequences of their
convictions.”188
As such, a noncitizen criminal defendant views
deportation as part of the penal sanction.

179. Id. at 1366; see also Sweeney, supra note 4, at 53 (describing how courts have
delineated between direct versus collateral consequences).
180. See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1481 (calling deportation a “severe ‘penalty’” (quoting
Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 740 (1893) (Brewer, J., dissenting))).
181. AEDPA, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 442, 110 Stat. 1214, 1279–80 (1996) (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (2006)); IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 240A, 110 Stat. 3009–
546 (1996) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101, 1229 (2006)).
182. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478 (quoting Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10
(1948)).
183. Id. at 1480 (citation omitted).
184. Cuthrell, 475 F.2d at 1366.
185. Id. at 1366 (citing Paige v. United States, 443 F.2d 781, 782–83 (4th Cir. 1971)).
186. Id. (quoting Moody v. United States, 469 F.2d 705, 708 (8th Cir. 1972)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
187. Id.
188. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1481–82 (quoting INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 322 (2001)).
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iii. Deportation and criminal convictions are intertwined
In noting that our harsh immigration laws have “enmeshed criminal
convictions and the penalty of deportation for nearly a century,” the Padilla
decision again suggested that deportation more closely resembles a direct
consequence rather than a collateral consequence of a plea.189 The Seventh
Circuit in United States v. George190 held that deportation was not a direct
consequence of a plea, stating, “[a] deportation proceeding is a civil
proceeding which may result from a criminal prosecution, but is not a part
of or enmeshed in the criminal proceeding.”191 Contrary to the Seventh
Circuit’s reasoning, the Padilla decision found deportation to be
intertwined with the criminal conviction.192 Further, the Court found it
“‘most difficult’ to divorce the penalty from the conviction in the
deportation context.”193
Additionally, the Padilla Court referenced the Second Circuit’s view that
the now extinct JRAD was “‘part of the sentencing’ process.”194
Summarizing the Second Circuit’s reasoning, the Padilla decision noted
that “the impact of a conviction on a noncitizen’s ability to remain in the
country was a central issue to be resolved during the sentencing process—
not merely a collateral matter outside the scope of counsel’s duty to
provide effective representation.”195 While recognizing that JRAD is no
longer available, the Supreme Court said that accurate legal advice is
especially critical now because deportation is “sometimes the most
important part . . . of the penalty that may be imposed.”196
Thus, if deportation is enmeshed with a criminal punishment and cannot
be divorced from the conviction, it follows that deportation is a direct
consequence of a plea and is part of the punishment.
2.

The consequences of deportation are severe for lawful permanent
residents
The second reason why Padilla supports the notion that deportation
constitutes punishment is the Court’s acknowledgement that the
consequences of deportation are severe. The severity of deportation for
lawful permanent residents demonstrates that deportation is punitive. In
assessing the importance of informing a client when a plea carries the risk

189. Id. at 1481.
190. 869 F.2d 333 (7th Cir. 1989).
191. Id. at 337.
192. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1481.
193. Id. (quoting United States v. Russell, 686 F.2d 35, 38 (D.C. Cir. 1982)).
194. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1480 (quoting Janvier v. United States, 793 F.2d 449, 452 (2d
Cir. 1986)).
195. Id.
196. Id. (footnote omitted).
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of deportation, the Padilla majority emphasized the severity of deportation
for lawful permanent residents.197 The Court stated that deportation is “‘the
equivalent of banishment or exile.’”198 While the Supreme Court in
previous cases acknowledged the severity of deportation without finding
that it constituted punishment,199 the fact that the Padilla decision took
particular notice of deportation’s severity, while at the same time
emphasizing the close connection between the conviction and the penalty
of deportation, bolsters the argument that the deportation of lawful
permanent residents is punishment.
Justice Stevens’ description of the underlying facts of the case highlights
the Court’s recognition of the severity of deportation:
Petitioner Jose Padilla, a native of Honduras, has been a lawful
permanent resident of the United States for more than 40 years. Padilla
served this Nation with honor as a member of the U.S. Armed Forces
during the Vietnam War. He now faces deportation after pleading guilty
to the transportation of a large amount of marijuana in his tractor-trailer
in the Commonwealth of Kentucky.200

The majority chose to highlight the following facts: (1) that Padilla was
a lawful permanent resident; (2) that he lived in the United States for more
than forty years; and (3) that he served with honor in the military during the
Vietnam War. The focus on these three facts demonstrates that a person
who has obtained permanent immigration status and who has become an
active and contributing member of our society has much to lose if deported.
He faces permanent separation from his family, loss of employment, and

197. Id. at 1481. Some argue that the severity of a consequence does not properly
distinguish between a remedial versus punitive sanction. See Pauw, supra note 4, at 326
(stating, as an example, that a community may quarantine individuals not to punish them but
to protect the community from a dangerous disease); see also Legomsky, The New Path of
Immigration Law, supra note 4, at 513 (“Any number of devastating losses can result from
any number of occurrences—car accidents, ill health, even intentional homicide—without
the consequence of being termed punishment.”). While severity may not be the only factor
demonstrating that deportation constitutes punishment, it is one factor that can point toward
a punitive intent. For instance, the type of criminal punishment imposed—or the severity of
the punishment—often takes into account the seriousness of the offense. When the
consequences of a penalty are overly severe, in comparison to the act committed, this can
demonstrate that the sanction is excessive and punitive.
198. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1486 (quoting Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388, 391
(1947)).
199. See, e.g., Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 587–88 (1952) (stating that
expulsion of long term residents “bristles with severities,” but is an inherent part of a
sovereign nation’s powers); Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32, 39 (1924) (citing Bugajewitz v.
Adams, 228 U.S. 585, 591 (1913)); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730
(1893) (recognizing that deportation may be “burdensome and severe,” but not punishment);
see also Delgadillo, 332 U.S. at 391 (recognizing that because deportation was the
equivalent of “banishment or exile,” the right to remain in the United States, according to
the Court, should not be based on “circumstances so fortuitous and capricious as those upon
which the Immigration Services has . . . seized”).
200. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1477.
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exile to a country that he may not even know. Moreover, it also
demonstrates that the position of lawful permanent residents in society and
the constitutional protections that should be afforded to them are
distinguishable from those who have temporary immigration status in the
United States.
The Padilla Court recognized the realities of deportation by focusing on
the severe impact it has on the deported and his family. The majority’s
statement toward the end of the opinion reinforces this point. In finding
that counsel must inform a client when a plea carries the risk of
deportation, the majority stated: “[o]ur longstanding Sixth Amendment
precedents, the seriousness of deportation as a consequence of a criminal
plea, and the concomitant impact of deportation on families living lawfully
in this country demand no less.”201
C. Deportation Proceedings Are Quasi-Criminal
The Padilla Court’s language highlights the punitive nature of
deportation, but deportation, as the Court acknowledged, is still civil.202 So
how do we classify deportation? The Padilla Court’s emphasis on the
“unique nature” of deportation and reflection that deportation is not “in a
strict sense, a criminal sanction” demonstrates that deportation falls
somewhere in the grey area of the civil/criminal divide.203 Deportation
involves both civil and criminal elements, making it appear quasi-criminal.
For instance, in the civil forfeiture context, the Supreme Court has
determined that proceedings with a civil label that have civil and criminal
elements involved are actually quasi-criminal.204 As the Court noted, the
objective of a civil forfeiture proceeding “like a criminal proceeding, is to
penalize for the commission of an offense against the law.”205 As in the
civil forfeiture context, when triggered by a criminal conviction,
deportation is conditioned upon the commission of a crime. Thus, as with
civil forfeitures, when deportation follows a criminal conviction, the
process is a quasi-criminal one.

201. See id. at 1486 (emphasis added).
202. See id. at 1481 (“[R]emoval proceedings are civil in nature.”).
203. Id. (emphasis added).
204. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 700 (1965); see also
Mann, supra note 11, at 1819 n.75 (stating that the forfeiture provision in Boyd v. United
States was implicated when conditioned upon the commission of a crime (citing Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616, 617 (1886))). According to Mann, “[t]his was a persuasive
reason for viewing the particular forfeiture as a criminal sanction.” Id.
205. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan, 380 U.S. at 700.
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IV. DEPORTATION ON ACCOUNT OF A CRIMINAL CONVICTION
CONSTITUTES PUNISHMENT FOR LAWFUL PERMANENT RESIDENTS
This Part explores the punitive nature of deportation for lawful
permanent residents on account of criminal convictions utilizing the factors
articulated by the Supreme Court. As explained in Part I.A, the Court in
Mendoza-Martinez laid out seven factors for determining whether a civil
penalty is punitive in nature:
[w]hether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint,
whether it has historically been regarded as punishment, whether it
comes into play only on a finding of scienter, whether its operation will
promote the traditional aims of punishment—retribution and deterrence,
whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime, whether an
alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable
for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative
purpose.206

These factors, when combined with the rationale in Padilla, demonstrate
that deportation based upon a criminal conviction is punitive for lawful
permanent residents.
Prior to a discussion of the Court’s factors, however, this Part first
explains why the deportation of lawful permanent residents should be
differentiated from the deportation of other classes of noncitizens.
A. Why Lawful Permanent Residents?
I do not argue that deportation constitutes punishment for all noncitizens.
My argument is that deportation of lawful permanent residents—when
predicated upon a criminal conviction—is punitive.
Lawful permanent residents constitute a distinct category for the
following reasons. First, lawful permanent residents have been admitted
permanently into the United States. As such, they have a heightened
immigration status compared with other classes of noncitizens,207 which
should in turn provide heightened constitutional protections during removal
proceedings. Second, there is no on-going immigration violation to be
cured, since lawful permanent residents are here lawfully. Therefore, the
arguments put forth stating that deportation serves a remedial function do
not apply to lawful permanent residents who are in the United States
legally and face deportation because of a criminal conviction.

206. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168–69 (1963) (citations omitted).
207. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 734 (1893) (Brewer, J.,
dissenting) (noting the differences between permanent residents and those in the country
temporarily).
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Lawful permanent residents enjoy a heightened constitutional status as
compared to other classes of immigrants
As the name implies, lawful permanent residents have been admitted
permanently into the United States. In deporting lawful permanent
residents for criminal behavior, the government is no longer seeking to
control the immigration process but instead is seeking to control the
behavior of those permanently admitted.208 Lawful permanent residents
have made the United States their home and have been given permission by
the government to do so by being admitted for permanent status in the first
place. Because of this heightened status, when the government seeks to
impose deportation for a criminal conviction, this should, at a minimum,
warrant heightened constitutional protections.
The idea that lawful permanent resident status deserves heightened
constitutional protections is not new. The Supreme Court in Landon v.
Plasencia209 stated that “once an alien gains admission to our country and
begins to develop the ties that go with permanent residence his
constitutional status changes accordingly.”210 Further, Justice Brewer, in
his dissenting opinion in Fong Yue Ting, stated that resident aliens were
equivalent to a British denizen.211 “A denizen is an alien born, but who has
obtained ex donatione regis letters patent to make him an English
subject. . . . A denizen is in a kind of middle state between an alien and a
natural-born subject, and partakes of both of them.”212 Justice Brewer
articulated that a resident alien, like a denizen, was protected by the
Constitution and laws of the United States.213 He asserted that resident
aliens were “entitled to a more distinct and larger measure of protection
than those who were simply passing through, or temporarily in [the
country].”214 Thus, Justice Brewer distinguished between those noncitizens
here for a temporary period of time versus lawful permanent residents.
Those in the latter category, he said, were entitled to heightened
constitutional protections.215
Deportation may be more severe for a lawful permanent resident than
other noncitizens because they are not “simply passing through” as Justice
Brewer indicated.216
A lawful permanent resident has established
significant ties to the United States.
Unlike someone who is

208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

Kanstroom, supra note 4, at 1907.
459 U.S. 21 (1982).
Id. at 32 (citing Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 770 (1950)).
Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 736 (1893) (Brewer, J., dissenting).
Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 736–37.
Id. at 734.
Id.
Id.
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undocumented, a lawful permanent resident has the warranted expectation
that the United States is his permanent home.217
2.

There is no on-going immigration violation to be cured by deporting
lawful permanent residents
Justice Scalia indicated in Reno v. American-Arab Anti–Discrimination
Committee218 that one remedial, non-punitive purpose of deportation is to
end an ongoing immigration violation.219 Contrary to Justice Scalia’s
statement, a lawful permanent resident has been admitted permanently into
the United States and is not living in the United States illegally. There is
no ongoing violation to end.
It could be argued that while a lawful permanent resident may not be
illegally present in the United States, his criminal behavior is a violation of
the terms upon which he was admitted. In fact, Justice Scalia also stated in
Reno that “[e]ven when deportation is sought because of some act the alien
has committed, in principle the alien is not being punished for that act
(criminal charges may be available for that separate purpose) but is merely
being held to the terms under which he was admitted.”220
The problem with this statement, however, is that immigration laws
consistently change. Because the Ex Post Facto Clause does not apply to
removal proceedings,221 a lawful permanent resident could be convicted of
a crime that at the time of commission, and at the time of admission into
the United States, was not a deportable offense. Therefore, prohibition on
committing this particular act would not have been part of his admittance
criteria. Ten years later, though, because of a new law passed by Congress,
it could become a deportable offense. In this environment, “noncitizens,
even lawful permanent residents, may be subject to a shifting, even
retroactive, regime of deportation sanctions.”222
217. Stating that deportation is severe for lawful permanent residents does not mean that
the consequences are not severe for other noncitizens. Those who are undocumented and
those who have acquired a temporary status may have an expectation of remaining
permanently in the United States, too. Like lawful permanent residents, non-lawful
permanent residents also face separation from their families, loss of income and removal to
a country that could be unsafe.
218. 525 U.S. 471 (1999).
219. Id. at 491 (stating that “deportation is necessary in order to bring to an end an
ongoing violation of United States law”).
220. Id.
221. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 594 (1952) (holding that the
constitutional ban on ex post facto laws does not apply because “[d]eportation, however
severe its consequences, has been consistently classified as civil rather than a criminal
procedure” (citing Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 154 (1923); Bugajewitz v. Adams,
228 U.S. 585, 591 (1913); Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 730 (1893)); see also Mahler v. Eby,
264 U.S. 32, 39-40 (1924) (holding the prohibition on ex post facto laws inapplicable
because Congress is not punishing appellants for certain acts but only ridding the country of
undesirables).
222. Kanstroom, supra note 4, at 1907.
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The Court in Mahler stated that deportation was not punishment but was
merely imposed to rid the country of undesirables.223 The goal of ridding
the country of undesirables, however, actually mirrors one of the goals of
punishment—incapacitation.
Therefore, ridding the country of
undesirables carries out one of the traditional functions of criminal
punishment and supports the argument that the deportation of lawful
permanent residents on account of criminal convictions is punishment.224
Arguing that deportation constitutes punishment for lawful permanent
residents does not mean the government can never deport a lawful
permanent resident.225 Admittedly, lawful permanent residents are not
citizens, and the government may remove noncitizens who commit crimes.
Even still, removing lawful permanent residents because of a criminal
conviction constitutes punishment. As I argue below, because deportation
is punitive, a lawful permanent resident—as someone permanently
admitted into the United States—should be afforded constitutional criminal
protections during removal proceedings. Liberty and even property
interests are at stake in the deportation process.226 As explained in Part V,
fundamental fairness under the Due Process Clause demands proceedings
that afford those admitted permanently enhanced constitutional protections.
B. Applying the Mendoza-Martinez Factors Along with Padilla’s
Rationale Demonstrates the Punitive Nature of Deportation for Lawful
Permanent Residents
The Supreme Court in Mendoza-Martinez set forth factors to be utilized
when determining whether a particular civil sanction is remedial or
punitive. The factors are to serve as guideposts, so no one factor is
controlling.227 Analyzing these factors—with the Padilla decision as
223. Mahler, 264 U.S. at 39 (citing Bugajewitz, 228 U.S. at 591; Fong Yue Ting, 149
U.S. at 730).
224. See STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND THE JUDICIARY: LAW AND POLITICS
IN BRITAIN AND AMERICA 208–09 (1987) (highlighting the fact that courts have not provided
explanation of why removal of undesirables from the country and removal of criminals to
prison serve different purposes).
225. See Pauw, supra note 4, at 332 (arguing that deportation as a means to get rid of
people who are a threat to the United States does not properly explain why deportation is
non-punitive). According to Pauw, if we were to arrest a citizen and exile him from the
community, we would consider this punitive. Id. He argues that this finding should not
change simply because we are referring to noncitizens. Id. Pauw states that noncitizens
“because of having previously been granted permanent resident status or because of close
family ties to citizens, may also have a justifiable claim to continue living in our
community.” Id.
226. The Court in Landon v. Plasencia noted the interests that were at stake when a
lawful permanent resident faced the possibility of not being readmitted into the United
States after having traveled abroad. 459 U.S. 21, 34 (1982). The lawful permanent resident
stood to lose the right to live and work in the United States and the right to remain with her
immediate family. Id. (citing Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 154 (1945)).
227. See Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 101 (1997) (finding that no one
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background—shows that the deportation of lawful permanent residents
constitutes punishment.
1.

Legislative history
Before applying the Mendoza-Martinez factors, the Court in MendozaMartinez first looked to legislative history to determine whether Congress
intended for the sanction—deprivation of nationality—to be punishment.228
The Mendoza-Martinez Court determined that the Congressional intent was
clear: the sanction employed was punitive.229
Thus, legislative history is a starting point for determining whether a
particular sanction is punitive. Courts will first look to whether Congress
intended to apply a civil or criminal label.230 Where Congress has applied a
civil label, courts will assess “whether the statutory scheme was so punitive
either in purpose or effect as to negate that intention.”231 Where there is not
“conclusive evidence of congressional intent as to the penal nature of a
statute, [the Mendoza-Martinez] factors must be considered in relation to
the statute on its face.”232
While deportation has been labeled civil, the legislative history indicates
that the statutory scheme negates that intention. Congress has continuously
implemented harsher immigration laws, while gradually removing
discretionary forms of relief to prevent deportation. In fact, the Padilla
decision detailed nearly a century’s worth of punitive immigration laws,
which have made deportation “virtually inevitable for a vast number of
noncitizens convicted of crimes.”233
In particular, the 1996 laws—IIRIRA and AEDPA—demonstrate that
Congress intended to punish noncitizens convicted of crimes by deporting
them.234 During one Congressional debate concerning IIRIRA, Senator
Roth stated: “the bill broadens the definition of aggravated felon to include
more crimes punishable by deportation.”235
Mendoza-Martinez factor should be controlling (citing Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372
U.S. 144, 169 (1963))); Dye v. Frank, 355 F.3d 1102, 1105 (7th Cir. 2004). The Dye court
held that a Wisconsin tax was punitive, even though it imposed no affirmative disability or
restraint or required a finding of scienter. Id. “[T]he absence of these elements [was] not
dispositive, as all of the factors [were] ‘relevant to the inquiry and may often point in
differing directions.’” Id. (quoting Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 169).
228. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168-69.
229. Id.
230. United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248 (1980) (citation omitted).
231. Id. at 248–49 (citation omitted).
232. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 169.
233. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1478 (2010).
234. Since the legislative history of immigration laws is so extensive, I focus exclusively
on the 1996 laws.
235. 142 CONG. REC. S4600 (daily ed. May 2, 1996) (statement of Sen. William Roth)
(emphasis added); see also Pauw, supra note 4, at 334 (stating that the broadened definition
of “conviction” was designed to remove immigrants regardless of valid justifications for
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A number of factors relating to the passage of AEDPA illustrate its
punitive, criminal-based intention.236 First, the stated purposes of AEDPA
were “[t]o deter terrorism, provide justice for victims, [and] provide for an
effective death penalty, and for other purposes.”237 These purposes reveal
an intention to punish criminals, not curb illegal immigration. Second,
AEDPA was codified at Titles 8 and 18 of the United States Code—
sections of the code dealing with crimes and criminal procedure.238 Third,
while drafting AEDPA, criminal sentencing guidelines were used to amend
the immigration definition of an aggravated felony. “In adding crimes to
the list, effort was made to ensure that the overall reach of the definition
would be consistent with the sentencing guidelines established by the
United States Sentencing Commission.”239 While the purpose of AEDPA
was to deter terrorism, President Clinton noted, “[t]he bill also makes a
number of major, ill-advised changes in our immigration laws having
nothing to do with fighting terrorism.”240
These are just some of the examples demonstrating the punitive intent
behind the passage of the 1996 immigration laws. More examples of the
punitive nature of this legislation will be provided during the discussion of
the Mendoza-Martinez factors.
2.

Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint
Mendoza-Martinez asks whether the sanction involves an affirmative
disability or restraint.241 In listing this factor, the Court cited to earlier
Supreme Court precedent that found that an act providing for the perpetual
exclusion from a profession following the failure to take a specific oath
was an affirmative disability or restraint that constituted punishment,242 as
was an act that prohibited any opportunity to serve the government.243 The
allowing continued residence).
236. See Kidane, supra note 4, at 427-28 (suggesting that a close reading of AEDPA and
its legislative history illustrates the statute’s punitive intention to “penalize wrongdoers”).
237. AEDPA, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, 1214 (1996).
238. Cf. Reiserer v. United States, 479 F.3d 1160, 1163 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding that the
legislature’s placement of a statute in the chapter of the Internal Revenue Code titled
“Additions to the Tax, Additional Amounts and Assessable Penalties,” rather than in the
chapter entitled “Crimes, Other Offenses, and Forfeitures,” evidenced a legislative intent to
impose a civil penalty rather than a punitive sanction).
239. H.R. REP. NO. 104-22, at 7 (1995).
240. 142 CONG. REC. 10055 (1996) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy) (detailing
President Clinton’s message upon signing AEDPA).
241. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 (1963) (citing Flemming v.
Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617 (1960); United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 316 (1946); Ex
parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 377 (1866)).
242. Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 377. But see Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93,
104 (1997) (finding that prohibition on participating in the banking industry is not equal to
the “infamous punishment of imprisonment” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
243. Lovett, 328 U.S. at 316.
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Mendoza-Martinez decision, however, also cited to a case in which the
denial of Social Security benefits to a deported alien was held not to
involve an affirmative disability or restraint,244 for it was not a situation
“approaching the ‘infamous punishment’ of imprisonment.”245
Following the Mendoza-Martinez decision, courts have had to assess
whether other sanctions involve an affirmative disability or restraint. In
one case, the dissent argued “imprisonment” to be “the clearest example of
a restraint.”246 The loss of parental rights has also been held to involve an
affirmative disability or restraint.247 However, statutes involving only
monetary penalties and laws requiring the collection of DNA samples from
inmates have both been held to not constitute an affirmative disability or
restraint.248
Thus, aside from imprisonment and loss of parental rights, case law is
not entirely clear on what constitutes an affirmative disability or restraint.
The deciding element seems to be the permanence of the disability—for
example, loss of parental rights—or whether there is actual restraint—
imprisonment.
The permanence of the effect of deportation should constitute an
affirmative disability. The deportation of a non-citizen, including that of a
lawful permanent resident, normally renders the person inadmissible for ten
years,249 but if the crime is an aggravated felony, the bar to future
admission is lifelong.250 Since the vast majority of deportations based upon
criminal convictions are aggravated felonies, the reality is that these
removals are typically permanent. Thus, the disability is severe and
profound.
As the Padilla decision recognized, “[t]he severity of
deportation [is] ‘the equivalent of banishment or exile.’”251 The United
244. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168 n.22 (citing Flemming, 363 U.S. at 617).
245. Flemming, 363 U.S. at 617.
246. Johnson v. City of Cincinnati, 310 F.3d 484, 517 (6th Cir. 2002) (Gilman, J.,
dissenting) (discussing the implications of Hudson, 522 U.S. 93).
247. Smith v. Dinwiddie, 510 F.3d 1180, 1189 (10th Cir. 2007). Despite holding that the
termination of parental rights proceedings involves an affirmative disability or restraint, the
court indicated that none of the other Mendoza-Martinez factors supported a conclusion that
such proceedings were penal. Id.
248. See United States v. Coccia, 598 F.3d 293, 298–99 (6th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted)
(holding that the DNA Act is not punitive); Reiserer v. United States, 479 F.3d 1160, 1163
(9th Cir. 2007) (citing Hudson, 522 U.S. at 104) (holding that statutes involving only
monetary penalties and no affirmative disability or restraint are not punitive); United States
v. Reynard, 473 F.3d 1008, 1016 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding any disability imposed by the
DNA Act to be minimal).
249. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(ii) (2006).
250. Id. The only exception to a permanent bar to reentering the United States is if the
Attorney General has consented to the individual’s admission. Id. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(iii).
This permanent bar applies only to aggravated felonies. Id. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(ii). Otherwise,
the bar for other convictions is ten years, or twenty years for repeat offenders. Id.
251. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010) (quoting Delgadillo v.
Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388, 391 (1947)).
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States may be the only country a lawful permanent resident knows, and the
deported may be removed to a country where he does not even speak the
language. A lawful permanent resident may be removed from “all that
makes life worth living.”252 Thus, under the “affirmative disability or
restraint” Mendoza-Martinez factor, the deportation of lawful permanent
residents is punitive.
3.

Whether it has historically been regarded as punishment
The next factor under Mendoza-Martinez asks whether the sanction has
historically been regarded as punishment.253 The sanction imposed in
Mendoza-Martinez involved the forfeiture of citizenship.254 The Court
determined that a review of historical practices supported its holding that
such a sanction constituted punishment.255 Specifically, the Court noted
that forfeiture of citizenship, as well as banishment and exile, had been
used as modes of punishment throughout history.256
The deportation of lawful permanent residents resembles the historical
practices of banishment and transportation (transporting criminals to penal
colonies) used in Europe to punish criminals.257 The Padilla decision even
referenced these historical practices when it stated that deportation is “‘the
equivalent of banishment or exile.’”258
Banishment was “[a] punishment by forced exile, either for years or for
life, inflicted principally upon political offenders.”259 Its origins date back
to twelfth-century England.260 Under the banishment system, a person who
committed a crime could seek sanctuary on sacred ground, and within forty
days would have to confess to the crime.261 In confessing, he would take
an oath to leave and not return without the permission of the Crown.262
Because banishment was not effective in achieving deterrence, it was
252. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922).
253. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 (1963) (citing Wong Wing v.
United States, 163 U.S. 228, 237–38 (1896); Mackin v. United States, 117 U.S. 348, 350–52
(1886); Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417, 426–29 (1885); Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4
Wall.) 277, 320–21 (1866)).
254. Id. at 146.
255. Id. at 168 n.23.
256. Id.
257. See Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law, supra note 4, at 513 (“From
ancient Rome to eighteenth and nineteenth century Britain, France, and Russia, common
forms of criminal punishment included exile, banishment, and transportation (particularly by
Britain to the American and Australian colonies).” (citation omitted)).
258. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010) (quoting Delgadillo v.
Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388, 391 (1947)).
259. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 740 (1893) (citation omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
260. Bleichmar, supra note 4, at 116–17 (using a historical analysis for arguing that
deportation constitutes punishment).
261. Id. at 120 (citation omitted).
262. Id.
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eventually abolished and replaced by the transportation system.263
Transportation—transporting criminals to British colonies—was a form
of punishment that began to take effect in early seventeenth-century
England.264 Transportation was “by way of punishment of one convicted of
an offense against the laws of the country.”265 Under the Transportation
Act of 1718, this practice became a more organized and official form of
punishment.266 It was typically used for “ordinary criminals,” though it had
been employed for more serious offenders.267
Justice Brewer’s dissent in Fong Yue Ting succinctly laid out the
historical basis for considering deportation as punishment. Justice Brewer
stated that deportation involved “an arrest, a deprival of liberty; and . . .
removal from home, from family, from business, from property.”268 These
consequences were, according to Justice Brewer, similar to the definitions
of banishment and transportation. He stated:
‘banishment’ is thus defined: ‘A punishment by forced exile, either for
years or for life, inflicted principally upon political offenders;
‘transportation’ being the word used to express a similar punishment of
ordinary criminals.’ . . . ‘Some punishments consist in exile or
banishment, by abjuration of the realm, or transportation.’ In Vattel we
find that ‘banishment is only applied to condemnation in due course of
law.’269

In a separate dissent, Justice Field rejected the majority’s reference to
other independent sovereigns’ powers to expel citizens—as had been done
in England by banishing 15,000 Jews, by Spain in expelling the Moors, and
by France in driving out the Huguenots in 1685.270 He stated, “[i]ndeed, all
the instances mentioned have been condemned for their barbarity and
cruelty, and no power to perpetrate such barbarity is to be implied from the
nature of our government, and certainly is not found in any delegated
powers under the constitution.”271
As described above, the practices of banishment and transportation
involved removing a person from the nation as punishment for a crime.
The methods employed today in relation to lawful permanent residents
more closely resemble these forms of punishment rather than the purported
263. Id. at 121.
264. Id. at 122.
265. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 709 (1893).
266. Bleichmar, supra note 4, at 125.
267. Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 740 (Brewer, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also Bleichmar, supra note 4, at 123–30 (providing a
summary of the history of the Transportation Act of 1718 as well as its effect on
transportation as a punishment).
268. Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 740 (Brewer, J., dissenting).
269. Id. (citations omitted).
270. Id. at 757 (Field, J., dissenting).
271. Id.
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remedial purpose of enforcing and regulating immigration laws. A lawful
permanent resident convicted of a crime is not deported because of
unlawful presence or a typical immigration violation. His deportation is
tied to his criminal conviction. Because of this, the Padilla Court found it
“‘most difficult’ to divorce the penalty from the conviction in the
deportation context.”272 A lawful permanent resident’s deportation in these
circumstances is predicated upon the conviction of a crime and is part of
the criminal punishment. Thus, under this Mendoza-Martinez factor, the
deportation of lawful permanent residents mirrors the historical practices of
banishment and transportation, which have been regarded as punishment.
4.

Whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter
The next factor listed in the Mendoza-Martinez decision is whether the
sanction comes into play only on a finding of scienter—intent.273 If the
sanction comes into play on a finding of scienter, then it is considered
punitive. In specifying this factor, the Court cited to cases in which a
showing of scienter demonstrated that a particular sanction was punitive.274
Under immigration law, lawful permanent residents face deportation for
specified criminal convictions. Lawful permanent residents convicted of a
crime involving moral turpitude can be deported.275 While crimes
involving moral turpitude generally require a finding of scienter,276
statutory rape—where no finding of intent is required—is also considered a
crime of moral turpitude.277 Statutory rape is also an aggravated felony
under immigration laws, and a lawful permanent resident convicted of an
aggravated felony is automatically deportable.278 Thus, while rare,
statutory rape is one crime resulting in deportation that does not require a
272. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1481 (2010) (quoting United States v. Russell,
686 F.2d 35, 38 (D.C. Cir. 1982)).
273. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 (1963) (citing Bailey v. Drexel
Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20, 37–38 (1922); Helwig v. United States, 188 U.S. 605, 610–12
(1903)).
274. Id. at n.24 (citing Bailey, 259 U.S. at 37–38; Helwig, 188 U.S. at 610–12).
275. Immigration and Nationality Act § 237, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A) (2006). The only
exception to a permanent bar to reentering the United States is if the Attorney General has
consented to the individual’s admission. A permanent bar to reentry applies only to
aggravated felonies. Id. § 1182(a)(9)(A). Otherwise, the bar for other crimes is ten years,
or twenty years for repeat offenders. Id.
276. See Cristoval Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687, 706 (B.I.A. 2008) (“A finding of
moral turpitude under the Act requires that a perpetrator have [sic] committed the
reprehensible act with some form of scienter.” (citation omitted)).
277. See, e.g., Franklin v. INS, 72 F.3d 571, 588 (8th Cir. 1995) (recognizing statutory
rape as a crime of moral turpitude, even though it does not require a finding of intent); see
also Bleichmar, supra note 4, at 153–54 (noting that statutory rape is a crime of moral
turpitude, and that it could lead to deportation).
278. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A); id. §
1227(a)(2)(A)(iii); see also Silva v. Gonzales, 455 F.3d 26, 29 (1st Cir. 2006) (finding that
all rape—including statutory rape—“comes within the aggravated felony taxonomy”).
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finding of intent. However, almost every other crime resulting in
deportation requires a finding of scienter.279
5.

Whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment
The next factor asks whether deportation will promote the traditional
aims of punishment.280 Under this factor, if a sanction promotes the
traditional aims of punishment, such as deterrence,281 retribution,282 and
incapacitation,283 then it may be punitive.
The Mendoza-Martinez decision cited United States v. Constantine284 to
support this factor.285 In Constantine, the Supreme Court held that a tax of
$1000 imposed upon the commission of a crime—violating state liquor
laws—was penal.286 The Court based its finding on the fact that the tax
was imposed upon the commission of a crime and because the amount of
the tax was grossly disproportionate to the normal tax of $25.287 These two
factors demonstrated “that the purpose [was] to impose a penalty as a
deterrent and punishment of unlawful conduct.”288
The Mendoza-Martinez Court also cited Trop v. Dulles289 while
discussing the aims of punishment.290 In Trop, the Supreme Court found
that a statute authorizing the loss of citizenship for those convicted by a
court-martial of wartime desertion constituted punishment.291 In assessing
the punitive nature of the statute, the Court found that a statute is penal if it
279. In my opinion, this factor is not well thought out, since an act such as statutory rape
that results in criminal punishment does not require a finding of scienter. See, e.g.,
Bleichmar, supra note 4, at 154 (“The question then becomes, if punitiveness in the form of
imprisonment may result under criminal law regardless of scienter, why is scienter relevant
in determining punitiveness at all.”). Although it is true that a criminal statute is generally
interpreted to include an element of scienter or criminal intent, “‘[t]he power of the
Legislature to declare what acts shall constitute crimes ordinarily includes the power to
make the commission of the act criminal without regard to the intent or knowledge of the
accused.’” Booksellers Ass’n v. McMaster, 282 F. Supp. 2d 389, 397 (D.S.C. 2003)
(quoting Guinyard v. State, 195 S.E.2d 392, 395 (S.C. 1973)). Nonetheless, these acts that
do not require scienter result in imprisonment—the clearest example of punishment.
Therefore, it is unclear why a finding of scienter is necessary to determine whether a
sanction is punitive.
280. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 (1963) (citing Trop v. Dulles,
356 U.S. 86, 96 (1958); id. at 111–12 (Brennan, J., concurring); United States v.
Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 295 (1935)).
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. See Richard S. Frase, Punishment Purposes, 58 STAN. L. REV. 67, 70 (2005) (listing
incapacitation as one purpose for punishment).
284. 296 U.S. 287 (1935).
285. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168 n.25 (including citation to Constantine, 296
U.S. at 295).
286. Constantine, 296 U.S. at 295.
287. Id.
288. Id. (citing Helwig v. United States, 188 U.S. 605, 613 (1903)).
289. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
290. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 170 n.25 (citing Trop, 356 U.S. at 96).
291. Trop, 356 U.S. at 97.
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“imposes a disability for the purposes of punishment—that is, to reprimand
the wrongdoer, to deter others, etc.”292
The traditional purposes of punishment are deterrence (general and
specific), incapacitation, rehabilitation, denunciation, and retribution.293
Specific deterrence, rehabilitation, and incapacitation “seek to prevent
future crimes by [a] particular offender.”294 Under the theory of specific
deterrence, the penalty that is imposed is meant to instill fear in an
individual offender that a similar penalty, or more severe one, could be
imposed in the future if the offender commits the same type of crime.295
Rehabilitation attempts to address the reasons for the individual offender’s
behavior and reform that behavior through treatment.296 Incapacitation
removes a person from the community so that he is not a danger to the
community while he is incarcerated.297
General deterrence and denunciation seek to prevent future crimes “by
members of the public at large.”298 In terms of general deterrence, the
penalty imposed on an individual is meant to instill fear in others within the
community so that they do not commit the same crime.299 Under the theory
of denunciation, the penalty is meant to establish social norms within a
society regarding law-abiding behavior and the seriousness of particular
crime.300
Finally, retribution is also considered a traditional aim of punishment.
According to the theory of retribution, “offenders should be punished in
proportion to their blameworthiness (or desert) in committing the crime
being sentenced.”301 An offender’s blameworthiness is dependent upon the
seriousness of the harm caused or threatened and the offender’s
culpability.302 “[O]ffenders are punished simply because they deserve to be
and the severity of their punishment should be no more and no less than
they deserve.”303
As will be demonstrated below, the purposes of deportation most closely
mirror those of deterrence, incapacitation, and retribution.

292. Id. at 96.
293. Frase, supra note 283, at 70–73.
294. Id. at 70 (emphasis added).
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Id. at 71 (emphasis added).
299. Id. (citation omitted).
300. Id. at 72 (citations omitted).
301. Id. at 73.
302. Id. (citing ANDREW VON HIRSCH, CENSURE AND SANCTIONS 29–33 (1993); Richard
S. Frase, Excessive Prison Sentences, Punishment Goals, and the Eighth Amendment:
“Proportionality” Relative to What?, 89 MINN. L. REV. 571, 590 (2005)).
303. Id.
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Deportation is for deterrence purposes

Deportation seeks to deter lawful permanent residents from committing
crimes.304 Under this theory, a lawful permanent resident who realizes that
another lawful permanent resident was deported because of a criminal
conviction will, theoretically, be deterred from engaging in the same
behavior.
b.

Deportation is for incapacitation purposes

Deportation is also carried out for incapacitation purposes—noncitizens
are removed from the country to protect the public from future criminal
behavior.305 Indeed, statements made by legislators during the debates
surrounding the 1996 laws illustrate that incapacitation was one reason for
these harsh laws.
For instance, during a House debate concerning the passage of AEDPA,
Representative Lamar Smith stated that recidivism was a major problem for
noncitizens: “[r]ecidivism rates for criminal aliens are high—a recent
GAO study revealed that 77 percent of noncitizens convicted of felonies
are arrested at least one more time.”306 Under the theory of incapacitation,
deportation would ameliorate recidivism rates by completely removing a
person from society. Representative Smith went on to say that under these
laws, “the forgotten Americans—the citizens who obey the law, pay their
taxes, and seek to raise their children in safety—will be protected from the
criminals and terrorists who want to prey on them.”307 The House
Judiciary Report on AEDPA stated: “[i]n the past, many aliens who
committed serious crimes were released into American society after they
were released from incarceration, where they then continue to pose a threat
to those around them.”308 Finally, during a Senate Committee Hearing on
IIRIRA, Senator Roth noted that “criminal aliens are a serious and growing
threat to our public safety.”309 These statements illustrate that the purpose
of the legislation was incapacitation—to remove noncitizens convicted of
crimes from the country because such individuals posed a threat to society.

304. See, e.g., Kanstroom, supra note 4, at 1894; Stephen H. Legomsky, The Alien
Criminal Defendant: Sentencing Considerations, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 105, 123–24
(1977) [hereinafter Legomsky, The Alien Criminal Defendant].
305. See, e.g., Kanstroom, supra note 4, at 1894 (citation omitted); Legomsky, The New
Path of Immigration Law, supra note 4, at 488; Legomsky, The Alien Criminal Defendant,
supra note 304, at 125–27.
306. 142 CONG. REC. 7972 (1996).
307. Id. (emphasis added); see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, FORCED APART: FAMILIES
SEPARATED AND IMMIGRANTS HARMED BY UNITED STATES DEPORTATION POLICY 18 (2007),
available at http://www.hrw.org/print/reports/2007/07/16/forced-apart.
308. H.R. REP. NO. 104-22, at 6 (1995) (emphasis added).
309. 142 CONG. REC. 10,054 (1996) (emphasis added).
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Deportation is for the purpose of retribution

Deportation also mirrors the theory behind retribution.310 Deportation,
according to this theory, punishes noncitizens in proportion to their
blameworthiness. Legislative history reveals that retribution played a role
in the drafting and passage of the harsh 1996 laws. For instance, in
choosing the crimes to be added to the definition of an aggravated felony,
the Judiciary Committee focused on “those that clearly demonstrate a
disregard for this nation’s laws.”311 Those convicted of such crimes “have
no legitimate claim to remain in the United States.”312 According to the
theory of retribution, because the offenders are not citizens, a criminal
conviction is even more egregious. Punishment for the underlying criminal
offense is not sufficient. Their just deserts must include more than
incarceration—they should no longer be allowed to remain in the United
States.
Thus, deportation mirrors the above theories of punishment.
Immigration laws providing for deportation on account of criminal
behavior seek to deter future criminal behavior, incapacitate the offender,
as well as serve a retributive function. Hence, deportation of lawful
permanent residents promotes the traditional aims of punishment and,
therefore, satisfies this Mendoza-Martinez factor.
6.

Whether the behavior to which the sanction applies is already a crime
The next factor asks whether the behavior for which a sanction is
imposed is already a crime.313 Under this factor, the Court examines the
underlying behavior and the sanction imposed on account of the behavior.
If the underlying behavior for which the sanction imposed is a crime, then
the factor leans toward the sanction being labeled punitive.314
As an example, in Lipke v. Lederer,315 the Court held that a tax imposed
on the illegal sale of liquor under the National Prohibition Act served a
punitive function.316 Lipke had been arrested for the illegal sale of

310. See, e.g., Kanstroom, supra note 4, at 1894 (citation omitted); Legomsky, The New
Path of Immigration Law, supra note 4, at 488; Legomsky, The Alien Criminal Defendant,
supra note 304, at 121–23.
311. H.R. REP. NO. 104-22, at 8 (1995).
312. Id.
313. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 (1963) (citing United States v.
Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 295 (1935); United States v. La Franca, 282 U.S. 568, 572–73
(1931); Lipke v. Lederer, 259 U.S. 557, 562 (1922)).
314. See La Franca, 282 U.S. at 572–73 (defining penalty as a punishment for an
unlawful act); Lipke, 259 U.S. at 562 (stating that if the nature of the imposition is a penalty,
then it must also be punitive (citing O’Sullivan v. Felix, 233 U.S. 318, 324 (1914); Helwig
v. United States, 188 U.S. 605, 613 (1903))).
315. 259 U.S. 557 (1922).
316. Id. at 558, 562.
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liquor.317 While his prosecution was pending, he received notice that he
was being taxed under Section 35 of the Act.318 After failing to pay the tax,
he received a second notice, which indicated that his fine had been
increased and that his property would be taken away if he failed to pay the
penalty.319 The Court asserted that the purpose of the tax was to “define
and suppress” crime.320 “Evidence of crime . . . is essential to assessment
[of the tax] . . . .”321 In this sense, the usual purpose of taxation—to
support the government—was not present in this section of the Act.322
Instead, the purpose of the tax was to punish the underlying criminal
behavior—the illegal sale of liquor.323
When a lawful permanent resident is deported because of a criminal
conviction, he is being deported because of his criminal behavior.324 As the
Padilla decision recognized, “recent changes in our immigration law have
made removal nearly an automatic result for a broad class of noncitizen
offenders.”325 Thus, like the tax imposed in Lipke, “evidence of a crime” is
necessary for deportation to be imposed. Therefore, under this MendozaMartinez factor, the deportation of lawful permanent residents is punitive.
7.

Whether a non-punitive purpose can be assignable to deportation
This Mendoza-Martinez factor asks whether an alternative, non-punitive
purpose can be assigned to the imposition of a particular sanction.326 For
instance, a sanction that has both punitive and non-punitive (remedial)
features may not necessarily constitute punishment if its purpose is not to
punish but rather to further a legitimate governmental interest.327
There are situations when deportation can serve a remedial purpose—for
instance, to control the admission process and entry at the border.328 The
317. Id. at 558.
318. Id.
319. Id. at 558–59.
320. Id. at 561–62 (citing Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20 (1922); O’Sullivan
v. Felix, 233 U.S. 318, 324 (1914); Helwig v. United States, 188 U.S. 605, 613 (1903)).
321. Id. at 562.
322. Id. (citing O’Sullivan, 233 U.S. at 324).
323. Id.
324. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) (2006) (providing that any alien convicted of an
aggravated felony is deportable).
325. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1481 (2010).
326. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168–69 (1963) (citing Flemming v.
Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 615, 617 (1960); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 96–97 (1958); United
States v. La Franca, 282 U.S. 568, 572 (1931); Lipke, 259 U.S. at 561–62; Bailey v. Drexel
Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20, 43 (1922); Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 319
(1866)).
327. Trop, 356 U.S. at 96 (citations omitted).
328. See Kanstroom, supra note 4, at 1907 (describing the three potential variants of
deportation laws: laws that deport those who have entered unlawfully, laws that deport
those who violate a condition of their admission, and laws that deport those who violate an
“express prohibition” of which the alien was informed upon admission).
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government may regulate entry at the border or deport an individual who
overstays his or her stay on a visitor’s visa.
The deportation of lawful permanent residents no longer merely seeks to
control the admission process or regulate entry at the border, but it instead
seeks to continuously control a lawful permanent resident’s behavior.329
Deportation of lawful permanent residents on account of criminal
convictions exists strictly to punish the underlying criminal behavior.
Thus, under the “alternative purpose” Mendoza-Martinez factor, the
deportation of lawful permanent residents on account of a criminal
conviction is punitive.
8.

Whether the sanction appears excessive in relation to the alternate
purpose
The final Mendoza-Martinez factor asks whether the sanction—
deportation—is excessive in relation to its alternate purpose.330 The
Supreme Court has found that when a sanction is excessive, “it is a penalty
in its intrinsic nature.”331 A number of courts have determined that this
Mendoza-Martinez factor should be afforded the greatest weight of all the
factors.332 According to one state court, “this factor cuts most directly to
the question of which statutes cross the boundaries of civil sanctions, and
which do not.”333
While generally the stated purpose of deportation is to regulate and
control the immigration process, the incredibly harsh effects of deportation
on lawful permanent residents convicted of crimes—especially minor
crimes—make this sanction excessive in relation to the government’s
purported purpose of regulating immigration. Senator Kennedy illustrated
this point during a hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee when he
stated that immigration laws “punish permanent residents out of proportion
to their crimes.”334
The real life stories of lawful permanent residents who have been

329. See id. at 1894 (arguing that deportation for post-entry conduct serves an
incapacitation and deterrent function (citations omitted)).
330. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 169 (citing Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350
U.S. 148, 154 (1956); United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 295 (1935); Helwig v.
United States, 188 U.S. 605, 613 (1903); Cummings, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 319).
331. See Helwig, 188 U.S. at 613 (holding a fine imposed that was “so enormously in
excess” of the ordinary duties was punitive).
332. E.g., Kellar v. Fayetteville Police Dep’t, 5 S.W.3d 402, 409 (Ark. 1999); Wallace v.
State, 905 N.E.2d 371, 383 (Ind. 2009) (citation omitted); Commonwealth v. Mullins, 905
A.2d 1009, 1017 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006); Rodriguez v. State, 93 S.W.3d 60, 75 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2002) (citation omitted).
333. Rodriguez, 93 S.W.3d at 75 (citation omitted).
334. 146 CONG. REC. 19,640 (2000); see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 307, at
36 (summarizing Senator Kennedy’s bill, S. 3120, which would have changed many
punitive aspects of immigration law).

MADDALI.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

PADILLA V. KENTUCKY: NEW CHAPTER?

10/2/2011 5:27 PM

47

deported or who are facing deportation for minor offenses best speak to the
excessiveness and disproportionate nature of the deportation laws. In 2010,
the New York Times reported on a fifty-year-old lawful permanent resident
with schizophrenia who had been living in the United States since at least
1974.335 Arrested on a trespassing charge, he was declared incompetent to
stand trial and sentenced to ninety days at a mental institution.336 Instead of
serving out his sentence, he was transferred to a detention facility and
placed in deportation proceedings.337 It is likely that this arrest, combined
with a previous criminal record, triggered removal proceedings.338
In another compelling story reported by the New York Times, a lawful
permanent resident was placed in deportation proceedings for two
marijuana offenses.339 Jerry Lemaine was arrested in New York after
police found a marijuana cigarette in his pocket.340 He pled guilty and was
fined $100.341 Because of a previous marijuana offense, he was placed in
removal proceedings.342 Under the interpretation of immigration laws in
the Fifth Circuit, which had jurisdiction over Lemaine’s case, two drug
possession convictions constitute drug trafficking—an aggravated
felony.343 As such, Lemaine was flown to Texas where he was incarcerated
335. Nina Bernstein, Plight of Mentally Ill Detainees is Outlined in Study, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 30, 2010, at A18.
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. According to immigration laws, there would have had to have been a prior criminal
record because a lawful permanent resident cannot be deported simply for trespassing. The
article is unclear as to the exact basis for which removal proceedings were triggered and
whether or not he was deported.
339. Nina Bernstein, How One Marijuana Cigarette May Lead to Deportation, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 31, 2010, at A17; see also Lemaine v. Holder, 391 F. App’x 353, 354 (5th Cir.
2010) (per curiam) (remanding the case to the Board of Immigration Appeals after the
Supreme Court’s decision in Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder).
340. Bernstein, supra note 335.
341. Id.
342. Id.
343. Id. The Supreme Court held in Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, however, that second
or subsequent simple possession offenses do not constitute aggravated felonies if the state
conviction is not based on a prior conviction. 130 S. Ct. 2577, 2589 (2010). In CarachuriRosendo, a lawful permanent resident was placed in removal proceedings because of two
drug offenses. Id. at 2580. For his first offense, he received twenty days in jail for
possession of marijuana. Id. For his second offense, he was charged with possession of an
antianxiety tablet without a prescription, receiving ten days in jail. Id. A conviction after a
prior conviction constitutes a felony under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and is subject to a two-year
sentence. Id. at 2581 (citations omitted). Under § 1101(a)(43)(B), a drug trafficking crime
in which the term of imprisonment is greater than a year constitutes an aggravated felony.
Id. (citations omitted). The petitioner in Carachuri-Rosendo was not charged as a recidivist
in state court where no finding was made regarding his first conviction. Id. at 2586–87.
Because he could have been convicted as a recidivist, the immigration court, and later the
Fifth Circuit, determined that his offense was an aggravated felony. Id. at 2583–84 (citing
Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 570 F.3d 263, 267 (5th Cir. 2009)). The Supreme Court
disagreed, holding that in order to fall under the recidivist provisions mentioned above, the
second conviction must have been based on the prior conviction, which it was not. Id. at
2589–90.
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for three years while he fought his deportation to Haiti.344
In a July 2007 report on United States deportation policy, Human Rights
Watch told the story of Mario Pacheco, a lawful permanent resident who
came to the United States from Mexico when he was two months old.345
Pacheco was convicted of possessing 2.5 grams of marijuana with the
intent to distribute when he was nineteen years old.346 While this offense
was considered a misdemeanor under Illinois law, it is an aggravated
felony under immigration laws.347 Pacheco was placed in deportation
proceedings.348
Deportation of lawful permanent residents can be excessive and has even
been described as cruel and unusual punishment.349 Justice Brewer, in his
dissenting opinion in Fong Yue Ting, stated: “[e]very one knows that to be
forcibly taken away from home and family and friends and business and
property, and sent across the ocean to a distant land, is punishment, and
that oftentimes most severe and cruel.”350 A judge of the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois shared this sentiment in a
case involving a petitioner convicted of selling marijuana and thus facing
deportation.351 In its decision, the court noted, “[i]n this case petitioner
stands to lose his residence, livelihood, and most importantly, his family.
Certainly if the same thing occurred to a United States citizen a Court
would not hesitate to call it punishment—moreover, cruel and unusual
punishment.”352
As described in Part II, because of the sheer number of crimes giving
rise to deportation, many lawful permanent residents find themselves in
deportation proceedings without the possibility of discretionary relief to
prevent deportation. As the Padilla Court noted, “recent changes in our
immigration law have made removal nearly an automatic result for a broad
class of noncitizen offenders.”353
While deportation is automatic for lawful permanent residents convicted
of aggravated felonies, many of the crimes constituting aggravated felonies,

344. Bernstein, supra note 335, at A17.
345. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 307, at 21.
346. Id.
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. See Leo Zaibert, Uprootedness as (Cruel and Unusual) Punishment, 11 NEW CRIM.
L. REV. 384, 386 (2008) (arguing that some forms of deportation constitute cruel and
unusual punishment); see also Legomsky, Deportation of an Alien for a Marijuana
Conviction, supra note 4, at 461–62 (arguing that deportation is an unnecessary and
disproportionate penalty for a marijuana offense).
350. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 740 (1893) (Brewer, J., dissenting).
351. Lieggi v. INS, 389 F. Supp. 12, 14, 17 (N.D. Ill. 1975), rev’d, 529 F.2d 530 (7th
Cir. 1976).
352. Id. at 17.
353. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1481 (2010).
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as illustrated above, are minor when compared to the severe penalty—“‘the
equivalent of banishment or exile’” as noted by the Padilla Court—of
deportation.354 In this regard, the sanction of deportation for lawful
permanent residents for minor offenses is undoubtedly excessive. Stephen
Legomsky, a professor and authority on U.S. immigration law, states that
“in the growing number of cases in which the severity of the deportation
sanction exceeds what is appropriate for the particular misconduct, the
excess represents a cost, or harm, of over-reliance on the criminal
enforcement model.”355 Thus, under the “excessiveness” MendozaMartinez factor, the deportation of lawful permanent residents is punitive.
9.

The vast majority of the Mendoza-Martinez factors support the
premise that deportation of lawful permanent residents constitutes
punishment
As discussed above, the majority of the Mendoza-Martinez factors—
especially viewed in light of the Padilla decision—weigh in favor of
finding that deportation of lawful permanent residents constitutes
punishment. The only factor that may weigh against a finding of
punishment is Mendoza-Martinez’s “scienter” factor. Although a majority
of crimes that can lead to deportation require scienter, statutory rape is one
crime that does not require such a finding. However, no single MendozaMartinez factor is controlling.356
When viewed as a whole, taking into account all of the MendozaMartinez factors, the deportation of lawful permanent residents appears to
be punishment.
V. A FRAMEWORK FOR DETERMINING WHICH CONSTITUTIONAL
CRIMINAL SAFEGUARDS SHOULD BE AFFORDED TO LAWFUL PERMANENT
RESIDENTS IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS—LESSONS LEARNED FROM
JUVENILE DELINQUENCY JURISPRUDENCE
Once it is established that deportation of lawful permanent residents on
account of criminal convictions can constitute punishment and that certain
constitutional criminal protections should be applied in removal

354. Id. at 1486 (quoting Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388, 391 (1947)).
355. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law, supra note 4, at 520.
356. Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 101 (1997) (citing Kennedy v. MendozaMartinez, 372 U.S. 144, 169 (1963)) (stating that no one Mendoza-Martinez factor should
be controlling); see also Dye v. Frank, 355 F.3d 1102, 1105 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that a
Wisconsin tax was punitive, even though it imposed no affirmative disability or restraint or
required a finding of scienter). The Dye court noted that “the absence of these elements
[was] not dispositive, as all of the factors [were] ‘relevant to the inquiry, and may often
point in differing directions.’” Id. (quoting Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 169).
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proceedings, the next important inquiry is to assess a framework for
determining the protections that should be provided.357 I begin this inquiry
by suggesting a framework, or principled approach, for making such a
determination.358 I propose that the approach used by the Supreme Court in
its juvenile delinquency jurisprudence could provide such a framework.
Specifically, in determining the constitutional criminal protections that
should be afforded to juveniles during the adjudicative stage of
delinquency proceedings, the Court has assessed whether the addition of
certain protections to delinquency proceedings would satisfy the
fundamental fairness requirement of the Due Process Clause. I suggest that
in the removal context, fundamental fairness under the Due Process Clause
should be the principled approach.
A. Juvenile Delinquency Jurisprudence: The Supreme Court Mandates
that Certain Constitutional Protections Should Be Afforded During
Delinquency Proceedings, Even Though These Proceedings Are
Considered Civil
Juvenile court proceedings, like removal proceedings, are considered
civil rather than criminal.359 In the juvenile delinquency context, however,
the Court has found this label to be merely one of “convenience”360 and, as
I argue in the removal context, such labels should be ignored. In spite of
the civil label, the Supreme Court has recognized that due process demands
that certain rights be provided during the adjudicative stage of delinquency
proceedings. Therefore, the civil label should not foreclose enhanced
constitutional protections during removal proceedings involving lawful
permanent residents.

357. In addition to constitutional criminal protections being afforded to lawful permanent
residents in deportation proceedings, it is equally important that legislative changes be
implemented to provide greater discretionary relief for lawful permanent residents who are
in removal proceedings because of an aggravated felony conviction. As noted earlier,
lawful permanent residents convicted of aggravated felonies are no longer eligible for
cancellation of removal. Under current law, immigration judges have no discretion to
cancel the removal of a lawful permanent resident convicted of an aggravated felony. Thus,
immigration judges currently cannot decide against deportation even if they find that such
an action is excessive in relation to the criminal offense. See also Pauw, supra note 4, at
340–41 (arguing that avenues for relief from removal should be expanded, for instance by
the revival of the 212(c) waiver of grounds of deportation for lawful permanent residents).
358. See Kanstroom, supra note 4, at 1932 (stating that “promising analogies might also
be derived from arenas in which arguably civil proceedings have been recognized as
criminal or quasi-criminal in nature” and highlighting the fact that juvenile delinquency
proceedings are “one obvious example”).
359. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 17 (1967) (explaining that restrictions on the
government in cases where an individual may be deprived of liberty were not applicable in
juvenile proceedings because they were civil proceedings).
360. Id. at 50.
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In re Gault—the right to notice of charges, counsel, confrontation and
cross-examination of witnesses, and the privilege against selfincrimination
In In re Gault,361 the Supreme Court held that juveniles were entitled to
notice of charges,362 to counsel,363 to confrontation and cross-examination
of witnesses,364 and to the privilege against self-incrimination365 during the
adjudicative stage of delinquency proceedings. Gault involved an appeal
from the Arizona Supreme Court, which had affirmed the dismissal of a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus.366 The Arizona Supreme Court
determined that while the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment was applicable to delinquency proceedings, the proceedings
under Arizona’s Juvenile Code that resulted in the child’s commitment did
not offend the requirements of due process.367 Appellants, Gault’s parents,
urged the Supreme Court to find the Arizona Juvenile Code
unconstitutional because Gault was taken from his parents and placed in a
state institution as a result of proceedings that denied him the right to notice
of charges, to counsel, to confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses,
and to the privilege against self-incrimination.368 The denial of these rights,
appellants argued, violated the Due Process Clause.369 The Court restated
its earlier holdings, finding that the Due Process Clause does apply to
juveniles.370 In Gault, the Court considered “the precise impact of the due
process requirement” on proceedings that determine whether a juvenile is
delinquent and can result in the placement of a child in a state institution.371
In assessing the precise impact of the due process requirement, the Gault
Court detailed the history of the juvenile movement in the United States,
which prescribed different procedures for children, compared to adults, in
criminal proceedings.372 The juvenile court movement sought to treat
children differently from the way adult criminal defendants were treated.373
“The idea of crime and punishment was to be abandoned. The child was to
be ‘treated’ and ‘rehabilitated’ and the procedures, from apprehension
through institutionalization, were to be ‘clinical’ rather than punitive.”374 It
361.
362.
363.
364.
365.
366.
367.
368.
369.
370.
371.
372.
373.
374.

387 U.S. 1 (1967).
Id. at 33 (citations omitted).
Id. at 41.
Id. at 57.
Id. at 55.
Id. at 3–4 (citing In re Gault, 407 P.2d 760 (Ariz. 1965)).
Id. at 4.
Id. at 10.
Id.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 13–14.
Id. at 14–18.
Id. at 15–16.
Id.
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was insisted that these proceedings were not adversarial and that the state
was simply acting as parens patriae.375
While the Court noted “the highest motives and most enlightened
impulses” of the juvenile court movement, it held that these worthy ideals
did not mean that juveniles should be denied fundamental fairness during
delinquency proceedings.376 After assessing some of the claimed benefits of
the special procedures afforded within juvenile court, the Court asserted
that the State could maintain the special characteristics of juvenile court
while at the same time extending the fundamental fairness requirement of
the Due Process Clause to juveniles.377 The Court noted that “[f]ailure to
observe the fundamental requirements of due process has resulted in
instances, which might have been avoided, of unfairness to individuals and
inadequate or inaccurate findings of fact and unfortunate prescriptions of
remedy.”378 The Court held that not all of the protections available in a
criminal trial needed to be applied to delinquency proceedings, but that the
hearing did require “the essentials of due process and fair treatment.”379
2.

In re Winship—the right to proof beyond a reasonable doubt
In In re Winship,380 the Court considered whether proof beyond a
reasonable doubt was one of “‘the essentials of due process and fair
treatment.’”381 Winship involved a boy adjudicated delinquent for
larceny—stealing money from a woman’s pocketbook in a locker room.382
Section 744(b) of the New York Family Court Act established a
preponderance of the evidence standard to be applied when determining
whether a juvenile was delinquent.383 The New York Court of Appeals
held this section of the New York Family Court Act to be constitutionally
valid, noting that delinquency proceedings were not criminal and were
designed “not to punish, but to save the child.”384
In assessing whether proof beyond a reasonable doubt should apply to
delinquency proceedings, the Winship Court provided a historical overview
of the reasoning for this standard of proof in criminal proceedings.385 The

375. Id. at 16 (citing Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 109
(1909)).
376. Id. at 17–19.
377. Id. at 26–27.
378. Id. at 19–20.
379. Id. at 30 (quoting Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 562 (1966)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
380. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
381. Id. at 359 (quoting Gault, 387 U.S. at 30).
382. Id. at 359–60.
383. Id. at 360.
384. Id. at 365 (quoting In re Samuel W., 247 N.E.2d 253, 254 (N.Y. 1969)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
385. Id. at 361–65.
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Court determined that such a standard of proof was necessary when an
individual stood to lose his liberty and would be stigmatized by a
conviction.386 It was also required to “command the respect and confidence
of the community in applications of the criminal law.”387 The Winship
Court believed that “[t]he same considerations that demand extreme
caution in factfinding to protect the innocent adult apply as well to the
innocent child.”388 It further noted that providing this standard of proof
would not detract from the beneficial aspects of juvenile court
proceedings.389 Thus, the Winship Court held that proof beyond a
reasonable doubt applied to juvenile delinquency proceedings.390
3.

McKeiver v. Pennsylvania—the denial of the right to a trial by jury
In McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,391 the Supreme Court held that a trial by
jury was not required at the adjudicative stage of juvenile delinquency
proceedings.392 The majority determined that this right was not essential to
due process or fair treatment and would not assist in the fact-finding
process.393
The McKeiver Court thought that providing the right to a jury trial in
juvenile court proceedings was unnecessary for a variety of reasons. The
Court found it noteworthy that a Task Force Report on the efficacy of
juvenile courts throughout the nation did not recommend a trial by jury.394
The Court also noted that a jury trial could bring the “clamor of the
adversary system” to juvenile court proceedings and further increase delays
and formality.395 The Court maintained that “[t]he imposition of the jury
trial on the juvenile court system would not strengthen greatly, if at all, the
fact-finding function, and would, contrarily, provide an attrition of the
juvenile court’s assumed ability to function in a unique manner. It would
not remedy the defects of the system.”396
In contrast, Justice Douglas’s dissent noted that when a juvenile was
prosecuted for a criminal act and faced confinement, the same criminal
procedures afforded to adults should be provided.397 The dissent argued
that a jury trial would “provide the child with a safeguard against being
386. Id. at 363.
387. Id. at 364.
388. Id. at 365.
389. Id. at 366–67.
390. Id. at 368.
391. 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
392. Id. at 545.
393. Id. at 543–46.
394. Id. at 545–46.
395. Id. at 550.
396. Id. at 547.
397. Id. at 559 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justices Black and Marshall joined with Justice
Douglas in dissenting. Id. at 557.
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prejudged.”398 According to the dissent, differentiating delinquency
proceedings from the criminal process was “spurious.”399 The dissent also
noted that “[t]his Court has discussed the futility of making distinctions on
the basis of labels in prior decisions. Because the legislature dictates that a
child who commits a felony shall be called a delinquent does not change
the nature of the crime.”400
B. Applying the Supreme Court’s Juvenile Court Framework to Removal
Proceedings Involving Lawful Permanent Residents
Using the Supreme Court’s framework in juvenile delinquency
adjudications as a spring board, I propose that courts should consider
whether a particular right is essential to due process and fundamental
fairness when attempting to ascertain which constitutional criminal
protections should apply to removal proceedings involving lawful
permanent residents with criminal convictions. Part of this inquiry
necessarily involves determining whether the right will assist in the factfinding process.
While the Court has already recognized that due process of law applies
to noncitizens in removal proceedings,401 this recognition has not
necessarily resulted in proceedings that are fundamentally fair. Similarly,
as noted above, pre-Gault decisions recognized that the Due Process Clause
applied to delinquency proceedings, but the Gault Court acknowledged that
certain rights were still denied to juveniles during delinquency proceedings,
resulting in proceedings that were not fundamentally fair.402 Therefore, it is
not sufficient in the removal context to simply say that due process applies.
Certain additional rights must be afforded. As in Gault, the Court must
consider “the precise impact of the due process requirement” in removal
proceedings.403
In addition to using the juvenile delinquency jurisprudence as guidance,
the test employed by the Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge is
398. Id. at 569.
399. Id. at 571.
400. Id.
401. Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1903) (“But this court has never held,
nor must we now be understood as holding, that administrative officers, when executing the
provisions of a statute involving the liberty of persons, may disregard the fundamental
principles that inhere in ‘due process of law’ as understood at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution.”).
402. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1967) (“Failure to observe the fundamental
requirements of due process has resulted in instances, which might have been avoided, of
unfairness to individuals and inadequate or inaccurate findings of fact and unfortunate
prescriptions of remedy. Due process of law is the primary and indispensable foundation of
individual freedom. It is the basic and essential term in the social compact which defines
the rights of the individual and delimits the powers which the state may exercise.”).
403. Id. at 14.
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instructive for determining whether the existing administrative procedures
in the deportation context are sufficient and comport with the requirements
of due process.404 Mathews asks whether the existing procedures “provide
all the process that is constitutionally due before a recipient can be
deprived of that interest.”405 The Mathews test balances governmental and
private interests by considering the following factors:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest,
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens
that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.406

In this Article, I do not attempt a comprehensive catalog of all the rights
that might apply to lawful permanent residents who are in removal
proceedings because of criminal convictions. However, two examples—
the right to counsel and trial by jury—illustrate how the fundamental
fairness principle invoked by the Supreme Court in the juvenile
delinquency context might be applied to particular constitutional rights in
the deportation setting.
1.

The right to counsel
Fundamental fairness should require that lawful permanent residents in
deportation proceedings have the constitutional right to an attorney, and an
attorney should be appointed if the individual cannot afford one.407
The Supreme Court in Gault did not recognize the right to counsel under
the Sixth Amendment, but it did recognize this right under the Due Process
404. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 321 (1976).
405. Id. at 332–33.
406. Id. at 334–35 (citation omitted).
407. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.16 (2011) (providing that an alien may be represented at no
expense to the government). The right to effective assistance of counsel in removal
proceedings is still unresolved. In In re Compean, Attorney General Mukasey partly
overturned In re Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637 (B.I.A. 1988), a case decided by the Board of
Immigration Appeals which established procedural requirements for filing a motion to
reopen removal proceedings based upon a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. In re
Compean, 24 I. & N. Dec. 710, 712–13 (A.G. 2009), vacated, 25 I. & N. Dec. 1 (A.G.
2009). In Attorney General Mukasey’s decision, he stated that noncitizens in removal
proceedings had no right to counsel or to effective assistance of counsel under the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 714. The decision was later vacated by
Attorney General Holder. 25 I. & N. Dec. at 1. Attorney General Holder’s decision,
however, did not address whether noncitizens have a right to effective assistance of counsel
in removal proceedings. Instead, Attorney General Holder stated,
In Compean, the introduction of a new procedural framework depended in part on
Attorney General Mukasey’s conclusion that there is no constitutional right to
effective assistance of counsel in removal proceedings. Because that conclusion is
not necessary either to decide these cases under pre-Compean standards or to
initiate a rulemaking process, this Order vacates Compean in its entirety.
Id. at 2–3.
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Clause.408 The Court stated that “[t]he juvenile needs the assistance of
counsel to cope with problems of law, to make skilled inquiry into the
facts, to insist upon regularity of the proceedings, and to ascertain whether
he has a defense and to prepare and submit it.”409 Because delinquency
proceedings could result in incarceration, the Court found the right to
counsel to be essential.
In the deportation context, lawful permanent residents face removal from
the United States. While deportation proceedings do not result in
incarceration, they involve an affirmative disability—near permanent exile
from one’s home. This result could be considered even more severe than
incarceration. The private interest at stake is significant.
Lawful permanent residents need an attorney who can make a “skilled
inquiry into the facts” and “insist upon regularity of the proceedings.”410
Without counsel, lawful permanent residents face the risk of erroneous
deprivation of the right to remain in the United States. Lawful permanent
residents who are not represented by counsel are not able to manage
complicated proceedings involving issues of criminal and immigration law.
Specifically, counsel is necessary to determine whether the underlying
conviction actually constitutes an aggravated felony or a crime involving
moral turpitude—both criminal grounds that can result in deportation.
Further, if a lawful permanent resident is convicted of a crime of moral
turpitude, counsel is necessary to determine whether the individual is
eligible for discretionary relief that would allow him to remain in the
United States.
Providing counsel would certainly add additional fiscal and
administrative burdens. It would require counsel to be appointed if a
lawful permanent resident could not afford one. However, when
considering the interest at stake—the right to remain in the country where
the individual has permanent residence—the additional burdens placed on
the government are minor compared to the errors that could result from a
lack of legal representation. An erroneous finding that a lawful permanent
resident was convicted of a deportable offense could result in near
permanent removal from the United States. Such an error has severe and
drastic consequences for lawful permanent residents.
The decision in Padilla reinforces this conclusion. The Supreme Court
required defense counsel to inform the accused of the possible deportation
consequences of a guilty plea.411 In doing so, the Court highlighted not
only the significance of deportation, but also the importance of competent
408.
409.
410.
411.

In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967).
Id. at 36 (footnote omitted).
Id.
Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010).
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counsel in ensuring that the defendant is able to proceed knowledgeably.412
2.

The right to a trial by jury
Unlike the right to counsel, the fundamental fairness approach does not
necessarily require the right to trial by jury in removal proceedings.
Specifically, such a right may not aid in the fact-finding process.
Typically, during such proceedings, the inquiry is a legal one—determining
whether a particular crime constitutes an aggravated felony or crime
involving moral turpitude. The facts are usually clear, since the court
records will normally reveal whether the defendant has in fact been
convicted, and if so, the crime resulting in a conviction. In this respect, it
would be unnecessary to have a jury resolve factual disputes.
Some crimes triggering removal are not aggravated felonies, so
discretionary remedies such as asylum and cancellation of removal can be
litigated. The decision to grant these remedies is likely best suited for a
judge who, unlike a jury, is familiar with the law and has more experience
hearing removal cases.
Thus, the right to a jury trial would not assist in the fact-finding process
and, therefore, would not be necessary to provide the essentials of due
process in the deportation context. Under the Mathews test, because of the
limited benefits of a jury in deportation proceedings, the government’s
interests would outweigh the provision of this protection.
CONCLUSION
Numerous factors illustrate that the deportation of lawful permanent
residents because of criminal convictions constitutes punishment.
The recent Supreme Court decision in Padilla has changed the
jurisprudential landscape in terms of how deportation is viewed under the
law. In two respects, Padilla bolsters the argument that the deportation of
lawful permanent residents constitutes punishment. First, the Court in
dictum demonstrated that deportation resembles a direct consequence of a
plea. As such, deportation is not separate from the criminal punishment,
but is, in fact, part of the punishment imposed. Second, the decision
emphasized the severity of deportation.
Additionally, in light of the Padilla decision, the factors applied by the
Supreme Court in Mendoza-Martinez demonstrate that the deportation of
lawful permanent residents in removal proceedings constitutes punishment.
Because of the punitive nature of deportation, I have suggested a
framework for determining the constitutional criminal protections that
should be afforded to lawful permanent residents during removal
412. Id. (citing Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388, 390–91 (1947)).
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proceedings based on criminal convictions. I have proposed that the
framework of fundamental fairness under the Due Process Clause, applied
by the Supreme Court to determine the protections that should be afforded
to juveniles in delinquency proceedings, could also be used in the
deportation context.

